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Avoiding Overtreatment at the 
End of Life: Physician-Patient 
Communication and Truly 
Informed Consent 
 
Barbara A. Noah* and Neal R. Feigenson** 
 
“Life is pleasant. Death is peaceful. It’s the transition that’s 
troublesome.”1 
—Isaac Asimov 
 
I. The Problem 
 
Americans are reluctant to acknowledge their mortality,2 
 
  * Professor of Law, Western New England University School of Law.  J.D. 
Harvard Law School. 
  ** Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law.  J.D. Harvard 
Law School. 
  © 2015 by Barbara A. Noah and Neal R. Feigenson.  This is a work in 
progress. Please do not cite, copy, or distribute without permission of the 
authors.  The authors would like to thank Stephen Arons and Kathy 
Cerminara for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
1. This seemed like an appropriate epigraph to begin with, in part 
because it begs the question of when the transition starts. And the answer to 
this question is part of the problem that this article attempts to tackle—when 
is the right time to start thinking about preparing for death and therefore to 
consider ceasing medical efforts to prolong life?  Part of the answer is that 
acknowledging the reality of death sooner rather than later in life probably 
makes it easier to accept when it arrives, but this is only a partial answer.  At 
the end of life, modern technology often makes it difficult to know when death 
is imminent and when it is still a little way off.  Expecting physicians to 
predict imminent death with enough precision and to know when to cease 
treatment or life support so that each patient dies neither a moment too soon 
nor a moment too late is expecting too much. 
2. Craig Bowron, Our Unrealistic Views of Death, Through a Doctor’s 
Eyes, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/our-unrealistic-views-of-death-
through-a-doctors-eyes/2012/01/31/gIQAeaHpJR_story.html. (“For many 
Americans, modern medical advances have made death seem more like an 
option than an obligation.”); see also INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, DYING IN 
AMERICA: IMPROVING QUALITY AND HONORING INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCES NEAR 
1
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and this reluctance is closely correlated with the trend toward 
more medical treatment at the end of life.  Recent research 
suggests that a growing number of Americans—nearly one-
third—believe that physicians should do everything to keep 
patients alive under all circumstances.3 Seriously ill patients 
and their physicians, not to mention healthy adults in general, 
often avoid discussing the inevitability of death and avoid 
planning for it.  In the absence of such decisions, the default 
treatment model focuses on preservation of life, often resulting 
in overtreatment and avoidable suffering at the end of life.4  
Even worse, the treatment patients receive may not be 
consistent with what their informed preferences would have 
been if their physicians had acknowledged the patients’ 
terminal prognoses, had appropriate discussions, and 
documented the patients’ preferences in the medical record or 
via an advance directive. 
There are various ways to assess whether, on the whole, 
 
THE END OF LIFE (Nat’l Acads, Press 2014) [hereinafter IOM, DYING IN 
AMERCIA; see generally Barbara A. Noah, In Denial: The Role of Law in 
Preparing for Death, 21 ELDER L.J. 1-31 (2013) (discussing cultural, legal, and 
other reasons why patients and physicians avoid making end-of-life 
decisions); see also Institute of Medicine, Dying in America: Improving 
Quality and Honoring Individual Preferences Near the End of Life, available 
at < http://iom.nationalacademies.org/Reports/2014/Dy. 
3. See Views on End-of-Life Medical Treatments, PEW RESEARCH CTR. 
(Nov. 21, 2013),  http://www.pewforum.org/2013/11/21/views-on-end-of-life-
medical-treatments/ (noting that this belief is still the minority view—31% of 
those surveyed in 2013 favored doing everything compared with 15% of those 
surveyed in 1990).  Some of this shift in favor of maximum treatment 
resulted from the fact that more of those surveyed were willing to express an 
opinion (versus choosing the option “don’t know”) but the data clearly 
indicate less support for allowing patients to die in certain circumstances 
(73% supported this option in 1990 versus 66% in 2013).  See id. 
4. See DANIEL CALLAHAN, SETTING LIMITS: MEDICAL GOALS IN AN AGING 
SOCIETY 17 (Simon & Schuster 1987) (“Not only has health been transformed 
as a medical goal and social ideal, but the place of good health in individual 
lives . . . has moved from the sphere of the accidental and fortuitous–where 
death was once the companion of all age groups, beyond the help of medicine, 
politics, and economics–to the realms of high science and established 
psychological and political expectation. The technological imperatives that 
transformed the nature of medicine from caring to curing have no less 
profoundly affected our idea of health, moving it from a nebulous hope to a 
fundamental human and social requirement. What can be done medically 
ought to be done.  What ought to be done ought to be available to all.  What 
ought to be available to all becomes the moral responsibility of all.”). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/2
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patients are receiving “the right amount” of therapy or life-
prolonging technology.  One approach is to ask whether the 
treatment improves physical outcomes objectively by 
prolonging life or improving quality of life.  Another approach 
is to consider whether the cost of administering life-prolonging 
care at current levels is a wise expenditure of increasingly 
scare health-care dollars. Finally, we can ask whether the 
treatment is consistent with the patient’s true wishes.  This is 
a subjective measure in which the quality of the care is 
evaluated according to its consistency with the individual 
patient’s values and beliefs. 
In the first part of this paper, we will explain that, by any 
of these measures, many dying patients are receiving too much 
therapy and life-prolonging care.  We will also briefly discuss 
the many factors that contribute to this state of affairs: the 
culture of denial of death, physicians’ professional culture and 
attitudes toward treatment, physicians’ fear of liability, 
physician avoidance of discussions about prognosis, and the 
impact of payment incentives that encourage overutilization of 
medical technologies. 
This paper’s primary focus, however, will be on considering 
how best to ensure that patients have the tools to make both 
informed and authentic choices about their care at the end of 
life.  We will argue that truly informed decision making can 
help to reduce excessive end-of-life care by any measure.  Most 
importantly for dying patients, better informed decisions can 
help reduce unnecessary suffering and result in care that 
aligns with their well-considered values and preferences. 
In the second part of this paper, we will explain that, 
under the doctrine of informed consent, physicians have an 
ethical and legal obligation to provide patients with timely and 
accurate information that will enable patients to make 
informed decisions about end-of-life care.  Yet compliance with 
informed consent law does not ensure that patients’ decisions 
are truly informed and, in practice, the norm is still to provide 
too much care. In the third part of the paper, we discuss 
several tools and techniques that are available to help 
physicians and patients achieve the goal of truly informed 
decision making, including training to promote the practice of 
shared decision making and the use of decision aids. 
3
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Even with these improvements, however, decision making 
at the end of life may not result in the “right amount” of care.  
We therefore also explore the concept of authentic decision 
making: decisions regarding end-of-life care that are fully 
considered in light of a patient’s well-developed values, beliefs, 
and goals of care.  The ideal of authenticity requires that the 
patient not only understand the nature of the treatment and its 
risks and benefits (as the doctrine of informed consent 
requires), but also have the emotional ability and the will to 
make the decision, as well as a functional value system that 
enables the patient to evaluate the appropriateness of the 
choice for him or herself.  This is particularly challenging 
because of the uncertainty inherent in prognosis, treatment 
outcomes, and adverse effects.  Although we do not argue that 
authenticity in this sense should or even can be legally 
required, we believe it is important to articulate it as an 
aspirational—and achievable—goal for decision making at the 
end of life. 
 
A. Overutilization of Care—The Evidence 
 
Patients say that they wish for a “good death,” but this 
idea surely must mean different things to different people.  
Nevertheless, most people’s idea of a “good death” likely have 
some elements in common, such as avoiding physical 
suffering.5  As another example, most patients state that they 
would prefer to die at home.6  Yet only about 30% of patients do 
 
5. For a review of the research on the multiple dimensions that influence 
perceived quality of dying and death, see Sarah Hales et al., The Quality of 
Dying and Death, 168 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 912, 912-18 (2008) 
(identifying several commonly identified qualities that a “good death” 
requires, such as freedom from pain and suffering, circumstances of death 
(home versus hospital), and cultural variables in different studied countries 
such as maintaining independence, control, self-determination, and 
entrusting decisions to others).  Id. at 913.  For an excellent overview of the 
idea of a good death and of the emotional issues surrounding death and 
dying, see SHERWIN B. NULAND, HOW WE DIE: REFLECTIONS ON LIFE'S FINAL 
CHAPTER (Vintage Books 1995). 
6. See GEORGE H. GALLUP, JR., SPIRITUAL BELIEFS AND THE DYING 
PROCESS: A REPORT ON A NATIONAL SURVEY (1997) (reporting results of a 
survey of U.S. residents commissioned by the Nathan Cummings Foundation 
and Fetzer Institute); I.J. Higginson & G.J. Sen-Gupta, Place of Care in 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/2
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so.7  Instead, we utilize significant amounts of hospital-based 
resources at the end of life,8 often with little or no measurable 
benefit to dying patients.  Many patients in the United States 
receive aggressive interventions such as cardiopulmonary 
resuscitation, ventilator support, or ICU care even when death 
is imminent.9 
 
Advanced Cancer: A Qualitative Systematic Literature Review of Patient 
Preferences, 3 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 287, 287-300 (2000) (finding that despite 
the fact that the majority of patients in England suffering from serious 
illnesses wish to die at home, most die in either hospital or a long-term care 
facility). 
7. See Joan M. Teno et al., Change in End-of-Life Care for Medicare 
Beneficiaries: Site of Death, Place of Care, and Health Care Transitions in 
2000, 2005, and 2009, 309 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 470 (2013) (concluding that, 
although only 24.6% of patients died in hospital in 2009 compared with 32.6% 
in 2000, percentages of deaths in long-term care facilities held steady at 
around 27% and deaths at home rose from 30.7% in 2000 to 33.5% in 2009); 
see also Yafu Zhao & William Encinosa, The Costs of End-of-Life 
Hospitalizations, 2007, HEALTHCARE COSTS & UTILIZATION PROJECT (Nov. 
2009), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK53605/ (describing data from 
2007 indicating that one-third of Americans died in hospital); Jeanne Lenzer, 
Unnecessary Care: Are Doctors in Denial and is Profit Driven Healthcare to 
Blame?, 345 BRIT. MED. J. e6230 (2012) (referring to another estimate that 
65% of deaths in the United States occur in hospitals).  Yet another study 
found that 45% of U.S. deaths occur in hospitals and 22% in long term care 
facilities.  See DIV. VITAL STATISTICS, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, 
DEATHS FROM 39 SELECTED CAUSES BY PLACE OF DEATH, STATUS OF DECEDENT 
WHEN DEATH OCCURRED IN HOSPITAL OR MEDICAL CENTER, AND AGE: UNITED 
STATES, 1999-2005 (2009), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/nvss/mortality/gmwk307.htm. 
8. It is well documented that one-third of medical expenses for the last 
year of life are spent in the final month and that aggressive therapies and 
technologies in that final month account for nearly 80 percent of these costs.  
See  Baohui Zhang et al., Health Care Costs in the Last Week of Life: 
Associations with End-of-Life Conversations, 169 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 
480, 482-84 (2009).  Moreover, 30 percent of Medicare dollars spent go to care 
for the 5 percent of Medicare beneficiaries who die each year.  See Amber E. 
Barnato et al., Trends in Inpatient Treatment Intensity Among Medicare 
Beneficiaries at the End of Life, 39 HEALTH SERV. RES. 363, 363-64 (2004); see 
also Teno, supra note 7, at 473 tbl. 2 (noting that, in 2009, 29.2% of patients 
who died had received care in an ICU in the previous 30 days); Donald M. 
Berwick & Andrew Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in U.S. Health Care, 307 J. 
AM. MED. ASS’N 1513 (2012) (describing 6 categories of health care spending 
waste, including overtreatment such as use of surgery when watchful waiting 
is better and unwanted intensive care at the end of life and estimating that 
wasteful spending in the overtreatment category accounts form between $158 
billion and $226 billion in 2011). 
9. See Amresh Hanchate et al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in End-of-
Life Costs: Why Do Minorities Cost More than Whites?, 169 ARCHIVES 
5
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These trends are worsening.  The most recent data indicate 
that, in 2009, 28.4% of patients received hospice care for only 
three days or fewer before dying, an increase from 22.2% nine 
years earlier.  Moreover, 29.2% of Medicare beneficiaries 
remained in an ICU during the final month of life compared 
with 24.3% in the earlier period.10  This pattern of 
overutilization of care at end of life results in situations where 
dying patients continue to receive costly therapeutic care and 
life-prolonging treatment even when it is very likely that the 
benefits in terms of enhanced quality of life, increased survival 
time, or other measurable physical outcomes are limited or 
non-existent.11  At the same time, we underutilize hospice and 
 
INTERNAL MED. 493, 497-98 (2009) (surveying use of expensive end of life 
interventions among a large sample of Medicare beneficiaries and finding 
patterns of substantial expenditure on life-sustaining treatment in the final 
six months of life).  One palliative care specialist describes the ICU as a place 
“where a Wild West culture makes it a challenge for palliative care to get a 
foothold,” adding that it is difficult “to slow a wild horse, particularly one that 
believes it can outrace death.” Jessica Nutik Zitter, They Call Me ‘Dr. 
Kevorkian,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2013, 1:37 PM), 
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/14/they-call-me-dr-kevorkian/ (adding 
that she “believe[s] in letting the dying determine how and when they die, as 
opposed to coaxing their organs at all costs”). 
10. See Teno, supra note 7, at 471-73 & tbl. 2 (also finding that 11.5% of 
patients had been hospitalized three or more times in the three months 
before death, up from 10.3% in the previous studied period). 
11. In a very recent study that attempts to measure physicians’ 
perceptions of when they are delivering “futile” care to their patients, the 
data suggested that approximately 20% of patients in 5 critical care units 
were receiving futile or “probably futile” treatment.  See Thanh N. Huynh et 
al., The Frequency and Cost of Treatment Perceived to Be Futile in Critical 
Care, J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. E1, E3-E4 and fig. 1 (Sept. 9, 2013).  
The survey instrument defined five situations in which treatment might be 
considered futile or medically inappropriate: burdens grossly outweigh 
benefits; patient will never survive outside an ICU; patient is permanently 
unconscious; treatment cannot achieve the patient’s goals; death is imminent.  
See id. at E2.  See also Robert D. Truog & Douglas B. White, Futile 
Treatments in Intensive Care Units, J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. (Sept. 
9, 2013) (critiquing the study design, arguing that legal complexities make it 
difficult for physicians to say “no” to futile treatment requests, and pleading 
for better communication and a conflict resolution process to address these 
situations); R. Sean Morrison et al., When Too Much Is Too Little, 335 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1755, 1755-56 (1996) (describing a case of aggressive treatment 
of an elderly patient with advanced, terminal disease despite his repeated 
requests that he receive no further treatment and observing that such over-
treatment interferes with quality of life for these patients with little 
offsetting benefit). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/2
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palliative care.12  The challenge is to identify those situations 
in which over-treatment is occurring (or is likely to occur) and 
to respond with treatment that is both clinically appropriate 
and consistent with the patient’s wishes.  Given that every 
patient is unique and end-of-life preferences and goals of care 
vary, this is not a simple process. 
In the context of terminal illness, many people believe that 
more therapeutic care (such as tests, procedures, life-
supportive measures and drug therapies) leads to longer life 
and improved physical well-being.13  We have all heard 
grieving families assure others that “the doctors did everything 
they could.”  “Doing everything” may help to alleviate feelings 
of distress or helplessness on the part of families and 
physicians, but it is not necessarily in the patient’s best 
interests.14  In fact, a growing body of evidence demonstrates 
that an emphasis on palliative care,15 in conjunction with 
 
12. See Teno, supra note 7, at 474 (noting that, although the use of 
hospice services has increased during the early 2000s, only 42.2% of Medicare 
beneficiaries with dementia and 59.5% of Medicare beneficiaries with cancer 
received hospice services at the time of death); Corita Grudzen & Deborah 
Grady, Improving Care at the End of Life, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1202, 
1202-04 (2011) (discussing over-use of therapeutic interventions at the end of 
life and advocating that better quality care often requires emphasizing 
palliative measures and avoiding unavailing therapies that risk unnecessary 
suffering and iatrogenic harm); Haiden A. Huskamp et al., Discussions with 
Physicians About Hospice Among Patients with Metastatic Lung Cancer, 169 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 954, 955-56 (2009) (finding that only half of 
patients with stage IV lung cancer had had any discussion with their 
physicians about hospice in the two months prior to death). These patterns 
are even more marked among racial and ethnic minorities in the United 
States. See generally Barbara A. Noah, The Role of Race in End-of-Life Care, 
15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 349-78 (2012). 
13. See Sean Palfrey, Daring to Practice Low-Cost Medicine in a High-
Tech Era, NEW ENG. J. MED. (2011), 
http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1101392?ssource’hcrc.pdf. 
(commenting on the mistaken belief that “ “‘doing everything’ is the best 
practice and the way to prevent harm”); Grudzen, supra note 12 (discussing 
comparative outcomes in the end of life care for three patients). 
14. See Bowron, supra note 2. 
15. “Palliative care” refers to medical care intended to alleviate 
symptoms associated with illness, whatever the patient’s prognosis.  Such 
care may address pain, shortness of breath, insomnia, depression, nausea 
and lack of appetite, among other symptoms.  See Lise M. Stevens, Palliative 
Care, 296 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1428 (2006).  Palliative care is often appropriate 
even while the patient is receiving therapeutic care; the two are not mutually 
exclusive.  Once therapeutic care is discontinued, palliative care continues in 
7
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carefully considered therapeutic care, can improve patients’ 
quality of life and even prolong survival.16 
An example helps to illustrate the seriousness of the 
problem and how easily the care of dying patients can go awry.  
A 73-year-old man was admitted via the emergency room 
complaining of progressive weakness on his left side.17  A CT 
indicated lung cancer with metastasis in the brain.  The 
patient refused further invasive tests, including biopsy of the 
lung tumor, explaining that he had watched his wife die of lung 
cancer and did not want tests or life-prolonging treatment.  
Various physicians again pressed the patient to undergo lung 
biopsy and he then agreed.  The biopsy confirmed lung cancer.  
The patient refused surgery to resect the cancer in the lung 
and brain and was discharged after 21 days in the hospital 
with full-time home care.18  The patient was readmitted to the 
hospital three months later after suffering three grand mal 
seizures.  A CT scan indicated that the brain mass had 
worsened; the patient continued to suffer seizures, could not 
talk, and was lethargic.  The patient’s son requested a DNR 
 
order to manage symptoms. 
16. See Jennifer S. Temel et al., Early Palliative Care for Patients with 
Metastatic Non-Small-Cell Lung Cancer, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 733, 736-38 
(2010) (finding that patients recently diagnosed with lung cancer who began 
receiving palliative care immediately lived an average of three months longer 
than patients who received standard therapeutic treatment only); Matthijs 
Kox & Peter Pickkers, “Less Is More” in Critically Ill Patients Not Too 
Intensive, 173 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 1369 (2013) (concluding, 
based on a meta-analysis of multiple clinical trials, that many common 
treatments for critically ill patients pose a high risk of iatrogenic harm 
compared with their potential benefit and ought to be used more cautiously). 
17. See Morrison, supra note 11 (describing a case of aggressive 
treatment of an elderly patient with advanced, terminal disease despite his 
repeated requests that he receive no further treatment and observing that 
such over-treatment interferes with quality of life for these patients with 
little offsetting benefit). 
18. One of the commentators on the case observed that, at that point, 
“He wants to return home as soon as possible and lead as normal a life as he 
can for as long as he can. With such a large brain lesion and lung mass, it is 
unlikely that he could be cured, and he should have been told this. He should 
also have been told that . . . the survival is generally longer after surgical 
resection than with no therapy or radiation therapy alone.  However, we 
must remember that it is his choice.”  Id. at 1756.  Of course, the patient’s 
“choice” is only meaningful if he has received the additional information.  
Failing to provide this information makes “his choice” a bit hollow in 
retrospect. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/2
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order based on his father’s prior wishes.  The neurology team 
again recommended surgery to resect the tumor in the brain 
but the family declined.  Over the next three weeks the patient 
received oxygen, various fluids and drugs via an IV, multiple 
blood tests and additional CT scans, and was fed via a 
nasogastric tube.  Although he was minimally responsive, he 
managed to remove the NG tube multiple times.  He was then 
placed in restraints and, after 24 days of hospitalization, the 
family was persuaded to consent to a gastronomy tube for 
feeding.  The tube was surgically inserted on the 29th day of 
hospitalization.  The patient had a cardiopulmonary arrest and 
died the following day.19 
This example illustrates several of the measures of 
overutilization of care described above.  The patient clearly 
suffered unnecessarily and also very likely incurred additional 
health care costs.  Most importantly, the care he received was 
inconsistent with his expressed wishes.  The patient was quite 
clear about his refusal of life-prolonging care.  He went home 
and skipped all follow-up appointments.  Nevertheless, he 
spent his final month of life in the hospital, attached to various 
tubes and restrained to prevent him from removing them.  His 
family appears to have wavered between respecting his wishes 
and being persuaded to do more.  As one physician put it, “We 
want our loved ones to live as long as possible, but our culture 
has come to view death as a medical failure rather than life’s 
natural conclusion . . . When their loved one does die, family 
members can tell themselves, ‘We did everything we could for 
Mom’  In my experiences, this is a stronger inclination than the 
equally valid (and perhaps more honest) admission that ‘we 
sure put Dad through the wringer.’”20 
 
 
 
 
19. Id. at 1757.  For another similar example of physician resistance and 
family ambivalence to withholding treatment, see Kathleen Bartholomew, 
“Saving” Bonnie, 174 J. AM. MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 13 (2014) (describing 
a dying 88 year old woman who, as a Christian Scientist had no regular 
medical care from physicians, and the refusal of an emergency room 
physician to write a DNR order at the request of the patient and her 
daughter-in-law (the author) because he didn’t “feel comfortable”). 
20. See Bowron, supra note 2. 
9
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B. Causes of Overutilization of Care at the End of Life 
 
How and why does this sort of excessive end-of-life care 
come about so routinely?  Broadly speaking, our medical 
system operates within a culture of denial of death.  A 
combination of trends provides evidence of denial.  Longer 
average lifespans, together with the promise of new therapies, 
encourages individuals to avoid confronting mortality.  Some 
researchers now talk of doubling the human life span, even of a 
“cure for death,” and of aging as a “disease” that should be 
“treated.”21  Although commentators have criticized this 
mindset,22 research into lifespan extension continues with little 
regard for the consequences of the distorted message it sends.23  
This quest for a fountain of youth denies the reality of 
mortality, and ignores the fact that more days or years of life 
do not necessarily guarantee more quality of life or more 
happiness.  In addition, cultural portrayals of older people 
create more ambivalence about aging.  We hear phrases like 
“fifty is the new thirty” and see advertisements for “adult 
communities” depicting vigorous, tanned septuagenarians 
playing golf and tennis.  At the same time, unlike other 
animals, we are conscious of our own mortality, which creates, 
at least for some, unsettling feelings of ambivalence.  The 
 
21. Closing in on the Cure for Death, FIGHT AGING (Sept. 2, 2003), 
https://www.fightaging.org/archives/2003/09/closing-in-on-the-cure-for-
death.php; see also Penni Crabtree, Fountain of Youth with Just a Shot in the 
Arm?, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., July 25, 2004, at Al (describing the Institute's 
claims and explaining that mainstream science has debunked anti-aging 
claims as "hucksterism" that offers little or no benefit but poses potentially 
serious health risks). 
22. See Daniel Callahan, Death and the Research Imperative, 342 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 654, 654-55 (2000) (quoting William Haseltine, then CEO of 
Human Genome Sciences as saying that "[d]eath is a series of preventable 
diseases" and arguing that research "should not, even implicitly, have 
eradication of death as its goal" because it supplants emphasis on the 
importance of relieving suffering at the end of life and it "promotes the idea 
among the public and physicians that death represents a failure of 
medicine."). 
23. Recent news stories document the efforts of tech billionaires to fund 
research into lifespan extension.  See, e.g., Ariana Eunjung Cha, Tech Titans’ 
Latest Project: Defy Death, WASH. POST (Apr. 4, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/04/04/tech-titans-latest-
project-defy-death/. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/2
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philosopher Ernst Becker captured the paradox eloquently: 
“Man is literally split in two: he has an awareness of his own 
splendid uniqueness . . . and yet he goes back into the ground 
in order blindly and dumbly to rot . . . .”24 These cultural 
influences have played a significant role in transforming the 
natural process of dying into a technologically-driven and, 
often, illogically overzealous prolongation of the lives of 
terminally ill patients.  It is also no surprise that, in this 
culture of denial, many people avoid planning for the end of life 
until the matter becomes urgent, and may try to avoid it even 
then. 
Physicians’ professional culture also appears to contribute 
to the problem.  Physicians themselves sometimes exhibit a 
striking reluctance to cease curative care for their patients, 
acknowledge their dying, and focus on symptom management 
instead of continuing to treat the illness aggressively.  
Commentators have noted that physicians’ attitudes towards 
these issues can vary according to their specialty.25  Surgeons, 
for example, have difficulty relinquishing control over post-
surgical patients because they fear retrospective censure about 
the appropriateness of the decision to perform the surgery, or 
because of guilt or “ego alienation” if the patient is faring 
poorly.26  One physician tells a story of an oncologist who was 
upset about his patient’s decision to stop chemotherapy and 
enroll in a hospice program.  The oncologist confronted the 
hospice physician and said, “We might as well just be walking 
away, and we might just as well shoot [the patient] now.”27  
Interestingly, physicians themselves, when facing death, 
frequently refuse invasive treatment, including CPR, 
preferring instead to accept the prognosis and spend their 
 
24. ERNEST BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH 26 (The Free Press 1973). 
25. See Soumitra R. Eachempati et al., The Surgical Intensivist as 
Mediator of End-of-Life Issues in the Care of Critically Ill Patients, 197 J. AM. 
COLL. SURGEONS. 847, 849-51 (2003). 
26. See id. at 850 (adding that surgeons may also wish to avoid 
appearing to lack confidence in themselves or may worry that losing a 
surgical patient will ruin their statistical success numbers). 
27. See Kevin B. O’Reilly, End-of-Life Care: Pain Control Carries Risk of 
Being Called a Killer, AM. MED. NEWS (Apr. 16, 2012), 
http://www.amednews.com/article/20120416/profession/304169955/2/ 
(relating an anecdote from a physician who directs a hospice program). 
11
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remaining time feeling as well as possible.28 
Another cause of overutilization of medical tests and 
interventions is the fear of making a medical error or being 
accused of hastening death, with the accompanying prospect of 
malpractice litigation.29  Fear of liability, together with a 
reluctance to deprive patients of hope, has created a culture in 
which physicians may hesitate even to raise the question of 
withdrawal or withholding of therapeutic or life-sustaining 
medical care unless the patient or family initiates the 
conversation.  And physicians are justified in this concern: The 
data suggest that a significant number of physicians in the 
United States have been accused of, investigated for, and 
occasionally prosecuted for murder and euthanasia in 
circumstances in which they discontinued life-supportive 
measures, provided drugs for pain control, or sedated patients 
 
28. See Teresa A. Hillier et al., Physicians as Patients: Choices 
Regarding Their Own Resuscitation, 155 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1289, 
1289-92 (1995) (describing a study in which physicians were asked whether 
they would want cardiopulmonary resuscitation if diagnosed with 
Alzheimer’s Disease, or various other advanced chronic diseases at various 
ages and finding that at all projected ages, most physicians would not want 
CPR, particularly with advancing age); Gregory P. Gramelspacher et al., 
Preferences of Physicians and Their Patients for End-of-Life Care, 12 J. GEN. 
INTERNAL MED. 346, 349-50 (1997) (finding that physicians preferred 
significantly less care at end of life than patients usually receive); cf. Garrett 
M. Chinn et al., Physicians’ Preferences for Hospice if They Were Terminally 
Ill and the Timing of Hospice Discussions With Their Patients, 174 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N INTERNAL MED. 466 at E1, E1-E2 (finding that physicians who 
preferred hospice for themselves were more likely to discuss hospice with 
terminally ill cancer patients); Ken Murray, How Doctors Die: It’s Not Like 
the Rest of Us, But it Should Be, ZOCALO PUB. SQUARE (Nov. 30, 2011), 
http://zocalopublicsquare.org/thepublicsquare/2011/11/30/how-doctors-
die/read/nexus. 
29. See Alan Meisel et al., Seven Legal Barriers to End-of-Life Care: 
Myths, Realities, and Grains of Truth, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS’N  2495, 2495 
(2000) (explaining that physicians overestimate the risk of malpractice 
lawsuits and that poor communication by physicians about end-of-life issues 
increased the risk of litigation); Palfrey, supra note 13, at e(21)(1) (“Most 
doctors are intensely risk-averse.  We don’t tolerate uncertainty.  Not 
wanting anything bad to happen, we reflexively overtest and overtreat in 
order to protect our patients—and ourselves.”); Phillip Wickenden Bale, 
Honoring Patients’ Wishes for Less Health Care, 171 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 
1200 (2011) (describing the repeated hospitalization of a very elderly patient 
in a long term care facility in contravention of surrogate decision-makers’ 
request to provide only comfort care in apparent reaction to a government 
fine of the facility due to the accidental death of another patient). 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/2
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whose suffering they were unable to alleviate in other ways.30 
Yet continuing inappropriate or “aggressive” care also poses 
risks of iatrogenic harm and additional pain or discomfort, 
often with no discernable offsetting medical benefit.  As 
commentators have recognized, sometimes less is more; there is 
a real risk of harm “in an environment that values treatment 
over care.”31 
It is difficult to say precisely how much unnecessary care 
at the end of life results from patient and family requests for 
such care and how much is the result of physicians’ 
unwillingness to be candid about the likely ineffectiveness of 
the care in prolonging life or improving quality of life.  
Nevertheless, there is clearly a causal connection between 
overtreatment at the end of life and poor communication 
between physicians and patients.  Research suggests that 
physicians avoid or delay disclosing details about patients’ 
prognoses or spontaneously initiating discussions about ending 
therapeutic care and making the transition to hospice.32  With 
respect to patients with likely incurable cancers, research 
demonstrates that, while two-thirds of physicians tell their 
patients at the initial visit that they have an incurable form of 
cancer, only one-third ever state the prognosis at any point in 
 
30. See Nathan E. Goldstein et al., Prevalence of Formal Accusations of 
Murder and Euthanasia Against Physicians, 15 J. PALLIATIVE. MED. 334 
(2012) (finding, based on survey data, that over half of respondents had been 
accused of euthanasia or murder by a patient or patient’s family member 
within the previous five years and 4% of those surveyed had been formally 
investigated for hastening a patient’s death); Lewis Cohen et al., Accusations 
of Murder and Euthanasia in End-of-Life Care, 8 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 1096, 
1096-97, 1101 (2005) (describing examples of such accusations along with 
occasional prosecutions and providing data for rates of prosecution in end of 
life care cases). 
31. See, e.g., Grudzen & Grady, supra note 12, at 1202. 
32. See, e.g., Nancy L. Keating et al., Physician Factors Associated With 
Discussions About End-of-Life Care, 116 CANCER, 998 (2010) (concluding that 
most physicians surveyed indicated that they would not discuss end of life 
decisions and choices with terminally ill patients until they exhibited 
symptoms or there were no remaining treatments available); Bethel Ann 
Powers et al., Meaning and Practice of Palliative Care for Hospitalized Older 
Adults with Life Limiting Illnesses, 2011 J. AGING RESEARCH (2011) 
(discussing the distinctions between and intersection of palliative care and 
end of life care and recommending better training of health care providers to 
understand that “end of life” is not a “well-demarcated period of time before 
death.”). 
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the relationship.33 Physicians also tend to overestimate the 
remaining life spans of seriously ill patients and to convey 
prognoses in overly optimistic terms.34  Even worse, a 
surprising number of physicians acknowledge deliberately 
deceiving patients when discussing prognoses.  In a recent 
survey of physicians, one in ten physicians admitted to lying to 
a patient within the previous year, and over half acknowledged 
that they had been unreasonably optimistic about a patient’s 
prognosis.35  Moreover, physicians report that even when 
 
33. See Belinda E. Kiely et al., Thinking and Talking About Life 
Expectancy in Incurable Cancer, 38 SEMINARS IN ONCOLOGY 380, 380-81 
(2011). 
34. See Nicholas A. Christakis & Elizabeth B. Lamont, Extent and 
Determinants of Error in Doctors’ Prognoses in Terminally Ill Patients, 320 
BRIT. MED. J. 469, 470-71 (2000) (finding that, in predicting patients’ 
remaining life expectancies, physicians were correct only 20 percent of the 
time and were over-optimistic 63 percent of the time and concluding that a 
closer doctor-patient relationship was associated with over-optimistic 
predictions); Elizabeth B. Lamont & Nicholas A. Christakis, Prognostic 
Disclosure to Patients with Cancer Near the End of Life, 134 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 1096 (2001) (finding that, in communicating expected 
survival times to patients with terminal cancer, physicians were frank with 
patients only 37% of the time, provided deliberately inaccurate survival 
estimates 40.3% of the time and preferred to offer no estimate for 22.7% of 
the patients studied).  The authors concluded that “for all of these patients, 
physicians were able and willing to formulate objective prognoses, whether 
accurate or not, but had difficulty communicating them, even to insistent 
patients.”; cf. Elisa J. Gordon & Christopher K. Daugherty, ‘Hitting You Over 
the Head:” Oncologists’ Disclosure of Prognosis to Advanced Cancer Patients, 
17 BIOETHICS 142, 142-68 (2003) (describing the results of a small focus group 
discussion with physicians in which many expressed reluctance to convey 
statistical details about prognosis because they felt that the information 
would seem too abrupt and would interfere with patients’ hope). 
35. See Lisa I. Lezzoni, et al., Survey Shows That at Least Some 
Physicians Are Not Always Open or Honest with Patients, 31 HEALTH AFFAIRS 
383, 383-88 (2012); Sandeep Jauhar, The Lies That Doctors and Patients Tell, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2014, 10:21 AM), 
http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/02/20/the-lies-that-doctors-and-patients-
tell/?_r=0 (explaining, with reference to his over-treatment of a very elderly 
and dying patient, that “[a]t their core, my actions were a kind of deception–
convincing myself, despite all the evidence, that I could save her, stay the 
inexorable course of her disease. Perhaps I was afraid of failure, or 
embarrassed by my impotence. Those last few days of her life she almost 
ceased to be a person for me. She became an experiment, a puzzle—one that I 
desperately wanted to solve.”); cf. Arato v. Avedon, 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993) 
(involving a claim by a deceased patient’s family that the physicians’ failure 
to disclose specific information about survival rates and times with 
pancreatic cancer impaired the patient’s ability to get his financial and 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/2
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cancer patients specifically request prognostic estimates, they 
would withhold their opinion or provide a willfully inaccurate 
figure in almost two-thirds of cases.36  This increases the risk 
that patients will pursue aggressive and debilitating 
treatments in the hope of prolonging life without fully 
understanding the implications of this choice.37 
Even when patients and families are generally well 
informed about medical matters, avoiding end-of-life decisions 
appears common.  In a recent article in the Hastings Center 
Report, one of the authors (a doctoral candidate in a well-
regarded medical humanities program) describes her mother’s 
struggle with advanced ovarian cancer and her attempts to 
protect her mother from hearing the truth of her prognosis.38  
After a brief remission following “countless rounds of 
aggressive chemotherapy,” the cancer had metastasized to the 
patient’s brain, yet no physician ever stated that the cancer 
was no longer curable or mentioned dying.  Just one day after 
the patient’s oncologist came by to discuss his recommendation 
of a new chemotherapy (which would have been the patient’s 
fifth), a palliative care physician explained that they should 
talk about the mother’s “options” because “things didn’t look 
good” on recent scans.  The patient decided to start hospice 
care, explaining that she felt “incredibly relieved” not to have 
to fight any more.  She died the next day.39 
This story illustrates a couple of common and problematic 
issues.  First, physicians will avoid having “the conversation,” 
especially if the patient and family also carefully avoid raising 
 
business affairs in order).  Of course, if the patient’s preference is to avoid 
receiving explicit information about prognosis, this is a different matter.  See 
infra notes 66 - 76, and accompanying text. 
36. See E.B. Lamont & N.A. Christakis, Prognostic Disclosure to Patients 
with Cancer Near the End of Life, 134 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 1096, 1096-98 
(2001) (concluding that physicians would provide a honest estimate only 37% 
of the time and would provide no estimate, or a deliberate overestimate or 
underestimate 63 % of the time). 
37. See supra notes 32- 36 and accompanying text (discussing physicians’ 
and patients’ over-optimism with respect to therapeutic benefits of treatment. 
38. See Nicole M. Piemonte & Laura Hermer, Avoiding a “Death Panel” 
Redux, 43 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 20-21 (2013). 
39. See id. (The daughter added that “I could not believe that the 
conversation I had dreaded most, the words that I thought would destroy my 
mother, had given her such a deep and profound sense of peace.”). 
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questions about prognosis.  Second, the current system creates 
an artificial dichotomy between curative and palliative care.  
Physicians who practice in the “curative” role tend to focus on 
clinical problem solving, will continue to advocate for therapy 
even when the prognosis is grim, and may often view death as 
a failure.  Physicians who practice in the “palliative care” role 
focus on the patient as a whole person rather than as a disease 
diagnosis and will view unnecessary suffering at the end of life 
as a failure.  When, however, care for a seriously ill patient 
integrates curative goals (for as long as they are clinically 
appropriate) with palliative goals, the patient, the family, and 
the physicians are better off.  There is no reason to keep these 
goals separate or to provide these two types of care only 
sequentially.40 
All of these problems are made worse by the fact that the 
system of reimbursement for health care in the United States 
often deforms the goals of care by paying physicians who 
provide more treatments and tests while failing to reimburse 
physicians for the more time-consuming and emotionally 
onerous task of discussing with patients the option of doing 
less. The Medicare program reimburses physicians and 
hospitals on a fee-for-service basis.  Simply put, this means 
that the more treatments, tests, and procedures the patient 
receives, the more reimbursement the physician and/or 
hospital will receive.41  Even not-for-profit hospitals need to 
 
40. There is much more to be said on the integration of curative and 
palliative care, but this is outside the scope of this article.  For an excellent 
treatment of this topic, see Laura P. Gelfman & Diane E. Meier, Making the 
Case for Palliative Care: An Opportunity for Health Care Reform, 8 J. HEALTH 
& BIOMEDICAL L. 57 (2012); Marie Bakitas, et al., Oncologists’ Perspectives on 
Concurrent Palliative Care in an NCI-designated Comprehensive Cancer 
Center, 11 PALLIATIVE SUPPORT CARE 415 (2013). 
41. See, e.g., Stephen F. Jencks et al., Rehospitalizations Among Patients 
in the Medicare Fee-for-Service Program, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1418, 1419 
(2009) (discussing the Medicare fee-for-service reimbursement system in the 
context of rates of rehospitalization for Medicare beneficiaries); Robert 
Steinbrook, The End of Fee-for-Service Medicine? Proposals for Payment 
Reform in Massachusetts, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED 1036, 1036 (2009) (discussing 
the incentives for overutilization of medical services created by a fee-for-
service payment system).  There is some promising news on this front.  The 
U.S. recently passed a bill that will attempt to remedy the worst effects of 
fee-for-service medicine in the Medicare Program.  The revamped 
reimbursement system will pay physicians based on the quality of the care 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/2
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keep their “patient census” high—their beds full—in order to 
avoid a deficit.  Many commentators have recognized the 
general problem of overutilization of health care resources and 
have recommended the implementation of various programs 
designed to target this problem.42 
Until very recently, attempts by the Obama administration 
to enact a provision to compensate physicians for discussing 
end-of-life planning with patients in the Medicare program 
have been derailed by “death panel” accusations.43  Despite 
repeated corrections of false statements regarding the content 
and intent of these regulatory proposals, recent polls showed 
that 41% of those surveyed continue to believe that reforms in 
the Affordable Care Act include panels that will opine on 
patients’ fitness to receive health care or will promote 
euthanasia.44  Nevertheless, in July, 2015, the Centers for 
 
they deliver rather than the quantity of care.  See Carol W. Cassella, Keep 
Patients Healthy, and Doctors Sane, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 15, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/opinion/keep-patients-healthy-and-
doctors-sane.html?_r=0; see also Siobhan Hughes, House Passes Medicare 
‘Doc Fix’ Bill, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 26, 2015, 7:03 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/house-passes-medicare-doc-fix-bill-1427386278. 
42. See, e.g., Christine K. Cassel & James A. Guest, Choosing Wisely: 
Helping Physicians and Patients Make Smart Decisions About Their Care, 
307 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1801, 1801 (2012) (describing various programs such 
as Choosing Wisely, Less is More, and the Good Stewardship Working Group 
that aim to educate physicians about commonly over-utilized tests and 
procedures). 
43. See Earl Blumenauer, My Near Death Panel Experience, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 15, 2009, at WK12 (describing U.S. Rep. Blumenauer’s efforts to 
implement Medicare reimbursement for this service and political uproar that 
followed, including a series of blatant falsehoods about the proposal offered 
up by its opponents); Robert Pear, Medicare Rule Urges Planning for End of 
Life, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 26, 2010, at A13 (discussing the initial Medicare 
regulation and the provision in the Affordable Care Act);  Kevin B. O’Reilly, 
76% of Patients Neglect End-of-Life Care Planning, AM. MED. NEWS (Feb. 27, 
2012), http://www.amednews.com/article/20120227/profession/ 
302279943/6/; cf. Benjamin Anastas, The Foul Reign of Emerson’s ‘Self-
Reliance,’ N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 2, 2011 at MM58 (discussing, as a modern 
result of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s “Self-Reliance,” “the American affliction of 
ignoring volumes of evidence in favor of the flashes that meet the eye, the 
hunches that seize the gut”). 
44. See ASSOCIATED PRESS, THE ASSOCIATED PRESS-GFK POLL: HEALTH 
CARE REFORM (Sept. 25, 2012), 
http://surveys.ap.org/data%5CGfK%5CHealthReform_2012_Topline_1st%20r
elease.pdf; Kaiser Health Tracking Poll – July 2010, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 
(July 29, 2010), http://kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/kaiser-health-
17
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Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMMS) issued a proposed 
rule that would reimburse physicians and other qualified 
health professionals such as nurse practitioners for having one 
or more discussions with Medicare patients and families about 
advance care planning.45  There now appears to be sufficient 
political support for these provisions to enable them to become 
final, though there remains a risk of obstruction from 
organizations such as the National Right to Life Committee, 
which argues that payment for advance care planning creates a 
bias against life-prolonging treatment and could exert pressure 
on some people to forego medical treatment in order to reduce 
costs.46 
Finally, all of this extra medical spending at the end of life 
does not appear to improve quality of care.  Recent studies 
have concluded that dramatic spending differences on end of 
life care among different counties in the United States have 
very little measurable effect on quality of care.47  To be clear, 
 
tracking-poll-july-2010/ (finding that 36% of senior citizens still believe that 
the health reform law will allow government panels to make end of life 
decisions for Medicare beneficiaries). 
45. See Medicare Program; Revisions to Payment Policies Under the 
Physician Fee Schedule and Other Revisions to Part B for CY 2016, 80 Fed. 
Reg. 41,686, 41,773 (July 15, 2015) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 405, 410, 
411, 414) (providing two new payment codes for advance care planning 
including the explanation and discussion of advance directives such as 
standard forms (with completion of such forms, when performed), by the 
physician or other qualified health professional—one code for the first 30 
minutes, face-to-face with the patient, family member(s) and/or surrogate and 
an second payment code for each additional 30 minutes of discussion and 
advance directive completion). 
46. See Pam Belluck, Medicare Plans to Pay Doctors for Counseling on 
End of Life, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2015, at A1. 
47. See Janice Hopkins Tanne, High Quality, Low Cost Healthcare Can 
Be Provided in U.S., Experts Say, 344 BRIT. MED. J. e1190 (2012) (explaining 
that “[t]he programme showed that some U.S. counties spend $17,000 (10,800 
pounds; 13,000 euros) per person annually on healthcare for people over 65 
years, whereas others provide equally good care for just $6000.”).  Elliott 
Fisher, professor of medicine at Dartmouth University, New Hampshire, 
said: “We could cover everybody without spending more,” adding that excess 
spending in the U.S. goes on hospitalization rather than outpatient care, 
specialist visits rather than care by primary physicians, and unnecessary 
tests and procedures.  “If all hospitals adopted the practices of the lower 
spending regions, health care costs would go down by 30%, saving $700bn to 
$800bn per year.”  Id.; see also THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE,  
http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/data/region/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2016) 
(providing state by state data on various aspects of end of life care). 
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/2
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the focus of this paper is on improving communication and 
quality of care at the end of life, not on cost reduction.48  
Although the issue is complex and the data inadequate to 
support any predictions, cost savings would be a fortunate side 
effect of achieving the central goal of providing patients with 
relevant information about their choices and encouraging them 
to think about and articulate to their health care providers 
their authentic end-of-life choices.49 
 
C. Calibrating Care Based on Patients’ Informed Wishes 
 
These systemic problems, together with the general 
reluctance to confront end-of-life decision making until the 
question becomes unavoidable, means that many end of life 
discussions happen too late or not at all.  While we will argue 
that improved and timely communication between physicians 
and patients and families at the end of life may result in 
improved quality of life, reduced overutilization of care, and 
 
48. There is little evidence that guidelines for end-of-life care reduce 
costs, and at the same time there is a great deal of risk that discussing cost 
reduction in the same conversation with ideas about improving end-of-life 
care by reducing over-treatment will generate controversy (to put it mildly).  
In the U.S. cultural climate, discussion of cost savings in conjunction with 
discussions about minimizing inappropriate treatment or life-supportive 
measures leads to public outcry while reducing opportunities for clear-headed 
conversation about how to improve care at the end of life.  And, because high 
quality palliative and hospice care also costs money, it is unclear how much 
savings would accrue if we were able to achieve a substantial system-wide 
reduction in ICU care and hospitalization at the end of life in favor of 
emphasis on palliative and hospice care.  Therefore, it is probably better to 
keep these issues separate and trust that cost savings may prove to be a 
positive side effect of improved end of life care.  In any event, as this article 
explains, there are other, better reasons for making these changes. 
49. See Steven J. Katz & Sarah Hawley, The Value of Sharing Treatment 
Decision Making With Patients: Expecting Too Much?, 310 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 
1559, 1560 (2013) (questioning the design of studies suggesting that shared 
decision making reduces health care spending in general and noting that 
“there is no evidence that patient preferences would inherently favor less 
extensive treatments than recommendations made by their physicians”); cf. 
Abigail Zuger, Testing the Limits of ‘Terminal,’ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2013, at 
D6 (describing the case of an acutely ill patient who was deemed “terminal” 
and thus denied ICU care and, arguing that ICU care would have been 
appropriate for this patient: “What are health care dollars, really, but 
bitcoins to feed time’s meter till mind, brain and body are all in the same 
place?”). 
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reduced risk of physician malpractice liability, the primary 
focus of this paper is on a different but related measure of 
quality of care at the end of life: whether the care that a 
patient receives comports with his or her preferences and goals 
for care.50  On this measure, “good medical care” can include 
the entire range of options from minimal treatment and 
emphasis on comfort care to providing all life-prolonging care 
in cases where the patient’s goal is maximal life-extension.  
The autonomy principle that undergirds end of life decisions 
protects each individual patient’s goals of care, whatever they 
may be.51  In order to evaluate whether quality of care is 
consistent with that principle, we must focus on the patient’s 
level of understanding about the medical interventions he or 
she accepts (or rejects) rather than the medical outcomes of 
those decisions. 
The law of informed consent, as explained in the next part 
of this paper, provides some protection for patients in this 
regard.  It requires that patients receive information about 
risks, benefits, and alternatives to treatment and that health 
care providers and institutions document that consent.52  
Informed consent alone should not, however, constitute the 
ultimate goal for this measure of quality of care.  As other 
 
50. See Jaime S. King et al., Toward the ‘Tipping Point’: Decision Aids 
and Informed Patient Choice, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 716, 716 (2007) 
(distinguishing between “effective” treatments and “preference-sensitive” 
treatments for which the best choice is measured according to how patients 
rate benefits versus harms). 
51. Physicians and health care institutions of course retain the right and 
responsibility not to provide medically futile care—care that cannot as a 
scientific matter reasonably achieve the medical goals sought.  Futility 
questions arise in two categories—questions of subjective value of the 
proposed medical intervention and questions about the probability of whether 
the medical intervention will be successful.  See Robert D. Truog et al., The 
Problem with Futility, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1560, 1561 (1992).  When it is 
clear that a proposed medical intervention simply will not accomplish its 
intended goal, physicians have no ethical or legal obligation to provide this 
care.  Commentators now recommend that the term futile should be replaced 
with “potentially inappropriate” to refer to medical care that has some chance 
of clinical success but that, for ethical reasons, clinicians feel should not be 
provided.  See Gabriel T. Bosslet et al., An Official 
ATS/AACN/ACCP/ESICM/SCCM Policy Statement: Responding to 
Requests for Potentially Inappropriate Treatments in Intensive Care Units, 
191 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 1318, 1319 (2015). 
52. See infra notes 53 to 90 and accompanying text. 
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/2
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commentators have observed, informed consent law fails to 
guarantee that patients actually comprehend their end-of-life 
care options.  To increase the chances that patients will be able 
to give (or withhold) truly informed consent to life-prolonging 
therapies and technologies, physicians, bioethicists, and others 
have promoted the practice of shared decision making and the 
use of decision aids, among other methods.  In the next parts of 
the paper, we will comment on these techniques in the context 
of how doctors and patients interact with each other and within 
our health care system. 
As we will explain in the last section of the paper, informed 
consent law, shared decision making, and decision aids can 
help to improve the quality of end-of-life decisions by any 
measure, but they do not guarantee the authenticity of end-of-
life choices.53  Authenticity is an ideal that goes beyond 
informed consent.  Authentic end-of-life choices are not just 
informed in the sense of being based on accurate 
understanding of risks and benefits of treatment; they also 
reflect the individual’s willingness to acknowledge his or her 
approaching death and to consider treatment and life-
prolonging measures in the broader context of his or her life 
and values.  In this respect, authentic decision making most 
fully promotes the ethical value of individual autonomy at the 
time in life when it matters most. 
 
II. End of Life Decision Making:  
The Limits of Informed Consent 
 
This section will provide a brief overview of end-of-life law 
in the United States, beginning with some background on 
patient decision making, surrogate decision making, and the 
ethical values of autonomy and best interests.  It will then 
 
53. See, e.g., Insoo Hyun, Waiver of Informed Consent, Cultural 
Sensitivity, and the Problem of Unjust Families and Traditions, 32 HASTINGS 
CTR. REP. 14, 15 (2002) (describing the role of authentic values in the ideal of 
personal autonomy and arguing that informed consent or the waiver of 
consent must rest on patient values that are “free of coercive formative 
influences.”); see also Daniel Brudney, Choosing for Another: Beyond 
Autonomy and Best Interests, 39 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 31, 31-32 (2009) 
(describing authenticity as “the capacity to be a particular self, a distinctive 
individual . . .”). 
21
  
758 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:3 
describe the legal doctrine of informed consent and its limited 
effectiveness in achieving its goals, due in part to patients’ 
limited ability to understand and process complex and 
inherently incomplete medical information.  Finally, the 
section will introduce the concept of shared decision making 
and the role of decision aids in promoting patient 
understanding and informed decisions about end-of-life care.  
These techniques can help to ameliorate, but cannot by 
themselves entirely solve, the problem of overutilization of care 
at the end of life. 
 
A. Patient and Surrogate Decision Making54 
 
In the United States, according to both law and ethical 
principles, medical care should accord with the individual 
patient’s wishes.  Patient autonomy (also sometimes referred to 
as the principle of self-determination), as implemented in law 
via the doctrines of informed consent and substituted 
judgment, is the primary principle that governs medical 
decisions, including those made on behalf of patients who have 
lost decisional capacity.55  In ideal circumstances, patients can 
express their preferences directly to their physicians at the 
appropriate time.  When a patient retains decisional capacity, 
the patient’s choice may be irrational, unreasonable, or unwise, 
but the doctrine of autonomy, with limited exceptions, protects 
these choices.  If, however, the patient has lost decisional 
capacity, physicians must attempt to ascertain the patient’s 
 
54. Much of this background discussion on U.S. end of life law is derived 
from Barbara A. Noah, A Better Death in Britain?, 40 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 868, 
870-915 (2015). 
55. See Alan Meisel, End-of-Life Care, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND 
BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR 
JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 51, 51-52 (Mary Crowley ed., 
2008) (“Autonomy is paramount for patients who possess decision making 
capacity, but it is also a major consideration for patients who lack this 
capacity.  Their wishes must be respected by the relatives or other health 
care proxies who make decisions on their behalf.”).  The American Medical 
Association (AMA) has acknowledged that patients have a right of self-
determination that includes the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, 
and that this right is not lost when a patient loses decisional capacity.  See 
Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, AMA, Decisions Near the End of Life, 
267 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2229, 2229-33 (1992). 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/2
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preferences through a process known as substituted judgment, 
using information from advance directives, conversations with 
family members or proxy decision makers, and the context of 
the patient’s values to guide patient care.  Under this approach 
of patient-directed care supplemented with substituted 
judgment, the goal is to preserve the patient’s autonomy even 
when he or she can no longer articulate a preference. 
For patients who lose decisional capacity, an autonomy-
based model of medical decision making does not work well 
unless the patients were previously willing to discuss their 
preferences in advance and, ideally, to document them in some 
form of advance directive.  Unfortunately, this does not happen 
as often as it should.  A recent survey conducted in California 
indicated that, while 80 percent of those surveyed believed that 
it was important to record their end-of-life wishes in an 
advance directive, less than a quarter of them had actually 
done so.56  Only 42 percent of those surveyed indicated that 
they had talked with a loved one about their end-of-life wishes, 
and only seven percent had discussed their wishes with their 
physicians.57  More recent sources indicate similarly low rates 
of advance directive completion.58 
 
56. See CALIFORNIA HEALTHCARE FOUNDATION, FINAL CHAPTER: 
CALIFORNIANS' ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCES WITH DEATH AND DYING (Feb. 
2012), 
http://www.chcf.org/~/media/MEDIA%20LIBRARY%20Files/PDF/PDF%20F/P
DF%20FinalChapterDeathDying.pdf (surveying 1700 adults in California). 
57. See id. 
58. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-95-135, PATIENT SELF-
DETERMINATION ACT: PROVIDERS OFFER INFO. ON ADVANCE DIRECTIVES BUT 
EFFECTIVENESS UNCERTAIN 2 (1995) (concluding that “advance directives have 
been advocated more than they have been used” and that “in general, only 10 
to 25 percent of Americans have documented their end-of-life choices or 
appointed a health care agent”); Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, 
Enough: The Failure of the Living Will, 34 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 31, 32, 36 
(2004) (noting that less than 20 percent of Americans having living wills and 
that studies also suggest that living wills rarely influence the level of medical 
care—in fact at least a quarter of patients with living wills receive care that 
is inconsistent with their instructions).  The most recent data suggest a slight 
uptick in the percentage of Americans who have completed advance 
directives.  See Jaya K. Rao et al., Completion of Advance Directives Among 
U.S. Consumers, 46 AM. J. PREV. MED. 65, 65-67 (2014) (finding, based on 
survey data from 2009-2010, that 26.3% of respondents had completed an 
advance directive and that older age, higher income, and higher educational 
attainment were correlated with a higher likelihood of having an advance 
23
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The law governing medical treatment and decision 
making, including end-of-life decision making, is mostly left to 
the states.59  Each of the 50 states has its own statutory and 
common law addressing health care decision making, and this 
fragmented system of regulation leads, not surprisingly, to 
inconsistent standards, procedures, and results in the decision 
making process.60  Thus, while all 50 states have incorporated 
the autonomy principle into their individual laws by 
acknowledging the authority of advance directives and formally 
appointed health care proxies,61 standards of proof for 
withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining treatment vary by 
state and by medical context, and some states restrict the 
circumstances under which advance directives can be used to 
withdraw or withhold some types of care.62 
 
directive). 
59. One notable exception, the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA), 
represents a federal effort to encourage the completion of advance directives, 
with very limited effectiveness.  See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-
95-135, PATIENT SELF-DETERMINATION ACT: PROVIDERS OFFER INFO. ON 
ADVANCE DIRECTIVES BUT EFFECTIVENESS UNCERTAIN 1 (1995); see also 
Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 58, at 30, 32 (commenting on the empirical 
studies that demonstrate the PSDA’s lack of effectiveness). 
60. For more detailed discussion on the United States end of life law, see 
generally ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW 
OF END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING (3d., Aspen Publishers 2004); Noah, supra 
note 2, at 249-52 (describing varying standards of evidence for purposes of 
allowing a surrogate decision-maker to refuse treatment on behalf of an 
incapacitated patient). 
61. See Alan Meisel, End-of-Life Care, in FROM BIRTH TO DEATH AND 
BENCH TO CLINIC: THE HASTINGS CENTER BIOETHICS BRIEFING BOOK FOR 
JOURNALISTS, POLICYMAKERS, AND CAMPAIGNS 51, 51-52 (Mary Crowley ed., 
2008). 
62. See Stephen Arons, Current Legal Issues in End-of-Life Care in 
LIVING WITH DYING: A HANDBOOK FOR END-OF-LIFE HEALTHCARE 
PRACTITIONERS 730, 733-36 (Phyllis R. Silverman & Joan Berzoff eds., 2004) 
(explaining, for example, that some state statutes restrict which treatments 
one can forego via an advance directive or at the direction of a proxy, such as 
withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration, and some states do not 
include permanent unconsciousness as a condition which can trigger the 
provisions of an advance directive).  About one-third of states exclude 
permanent unconsciousness as a condition for which advance directives can 
be used to withhold or withdraw care and at least three-quarters of states 
permit individual health care providers to refuse to carry out patient wishes, 
for reasons of conscience or for no reason at all.  See id. at 730, 734.  Many of 
the state statutes that restrict the use of advance directives to particular 
types of medical situations potentially raise constitutional questions and 
might be challenged on this basis. 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/2
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Despite this heavy emphasis on the principle of autonomy, 
American law also includes references to, and consideration of, 
the principle of the patient’s best interests.  In some cases, an 
analysis based on the patient’s best interests can lead to the 
rejection of life-prolonging treatment that might otherwise be 
continued, on the basis that the treatment in question does not 
confer a benefit to the patient by improving quality of life.  
Many states’ laws already acknowledge a place for best 
interests analysis in making treatment decisions for 
incapacitated patients.63  For example, courts have recognized 
the concept of “proportionate treatment,” and have suggested 
that “a treatment course which is only minimally painful or 
intrusive may nonetheless be considered disproportionate to 
the potential benefits if the prognosis is virtually hopeless for 
any significant improvement in condition.”64  In one New York 
decision, the court refused to authorize life-prolonging 
treatment for an incapacitated adult who had suffered several 
strokes and had very little cognitive ability, holding that 
incapacitated patients retain their right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment and that the surgery would at best 
prolong the dying process while providing “no human or 
humane benefit” to her.65  And in a well-regarded New Jersey 
decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court envisioned a sliding 
 
63. For example, New York permits an appointed health care agent to 
make a decision, in the absence of information about the patient’s wishes, to 
withdraw care in accordance with the patient’s best interests, but it contains 
an express exception for artificial nutrition and hydration.  Only if the 
patient has specifically spoken on this matter may the health care agent 
request the withdrawal of this type of life-sustaining medical technology.  See 
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW art. 29-C § 2982(4) (McKinney 2014).  State law in 
Massachusetts instructs health care proxies to make decisions for 
incapacitated patients based on what the patient would choose but, if this is 
unknown, instructs the proxy to decide what is in the patient’s best interests.  
See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 201D, § 5 (1997) (“After consultation with health 
care providers, and after full consideration of acceptable medical alternatives 
regarding diagnosis, prognosis, treatments and their side effects, the agent 
shall make health care decisions: (i) in accordance with the agent’s 
assessment of the principal’s wishes, including the principal’s religious and 
moral beliefs, or (ii) if the principal’s wishes are unknown, in accordance with 
the agent’s assessment of the principal’s best interests.”). 
64. Barber v. Superior Ct., 195 Cal. Rptr. 484, 491 (Ct. App. 1983) 
(permitting withdrawal of treatment from a comatose patient). 
65. In re Beth Israel Med. Ctr. for Weinstein, 519 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513-14, 
18 (Super. Ct. 1987). 
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scale from pure autonomy-based decision making to pure best 
interests-based decision making, depending on the quality and 
quantity of available evidence of the patient’s wishes.66 
Often, however, when a patient loses decisional capacity, 
insufficient evidence of the patient’s wishes will leave 
physicians and family members in a quandary as to whether to 
continue providing therapeutic treatment or life-sustaining 
care.  Uncertainty about prognosis in the case of terminal 
illness and the possibility of some recovery of function in the 
case of severe brain injury add to the complexity of decisions 
about withdrawing treatment or life-supportive measures.  
Occasional references to best interests analysis aside, 
American law generally favors continued life supportive 
measures when the patient’s wishes are in dispute or unknown.  
As the Schiavo litigation and other cases of its type illustrate, 
many individuals, with the backing of courts, take the position 
that end-of-life laws should default to continued treatment 
whenever a patient’s choice or best interests are in dispute, 
without regard to any assessment of the patient’s quality of 
life.67 
 
 
66. In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232-33 (N.J. 1985) (explaining that 
under a “limited-objective test,” life-sustaining treatments may be withdrawn 
or withheld when there is some reliable evidence that the patient would wish 
it and when it is clear that the burdens of continued life with treatment 
outweigh the benefits and that under a “pure-objective test,” treatment 
similarly may be withdrawn or withheld in cases where the “net burdens of 
the patient’s life with the treatment . . . clearly and markedly outweigh the 
benefits that the patient derives from life” even where there is no evidence of 
the patient’s preferences). 
67. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 281 
(1990) (“[A] state may properly decline to make judgments about the ‘quality’ 
of life that a particular person may enjoy and simply assert an unqualified 
interest in the preservation of human life to be weighed against the 
constitutionally protected interests of the individual.”); Conservatorship of 
Wendland, 28 P.3d 151, 174 (Cal. 2001) (upholding a trial court decision to 
continue life-sustaining treatment despite a proxy decision-maker’s request 
to withdraw it because the proxy “offered no basis for such a finding other 
than her own subjective judgment that the conservatee did not enjoy a 
satisfactory quality of life and legally insufficient evidence to the effect that 
he would have wished to die”); In re Wanglie, No. PX-91-283 (Prob. Ct. 
Hennepin Co., Minn., June 28, 1991) (upholding the surrogate’s request for 
continued treatment of the patient, who was in a persistent vegetative state 
and who died more than a year later of sepsis). 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/2
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B. Informed Consent Law and Its Role in End-of-Life 
Decisions 
 
Ideally, patients’ decisions would always reflect the 
principle of autonomy because they are governed by the law of 
informed consent. Informed consent is ethically and legally 
required for all medical procedures and treatment 
relationships.  As explained in the Nuremberg Code, ethically 
valid consent requires adequate information, freedom of choice, 
and the capacity to make the decision in question.68  As to the 
information disclosed, in general, informed consent requires a 
discussion of the risks,69 benefits, and alternatives to the 
proposed medical intervention, including the option of doing 
nothing, or withholding or withdrawing care.70  The protection 
of the autonomy principle that informed consent law provides 
 
68. See The Nuremberg Code, HHS (Nov. 7, 2005), 
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/archive/nurcode.html (describing “voluntary 
consent” as meaning that “that the person involved should have legal 
capacity to give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free 
power of choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, 
deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; 
and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of 
the subject matter involved, as to enable him to make an understanding and 
enlightened decision.”).  For a careful analysis of decisional capacity and its 
elements see Eike-Henner W. Kluge, Competence, Capacity, and Informed 
Consent: Beyond the Cognitive-Competence Model, 24 CAN. J. ON AGING 295, 
297 (2005) (distinguishing between competence and capacity in the context of 
informed consent and suggesting that valid consent requires more than 
simply the cognitive ability to process the relevant information); see also Paul 
S. Appelbaum, Assessment of Patients’ Competence to Consent to Treatment, 
357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1834, 1834-35 (2007) (describing the requirement of 
decisional capacity (or competence) for valid informed consent to treatment). 
69. As commentators on medical consent have explained, “The 
magnitude of the risks and their frequency should receive special emphasis.  
Also considered are alternative treatments and their benefits, risks, and 
measured utility, the likely results of no treatment; and the probability of a 
good outcome with the proposed strategy.”  See Timothy J. Paterick et al., 
Medical Informed Consent: General Considerations for Physicians, 83 MAYO 
CLINIC PROC. 313, 316 (2008). 
70. See generally BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW § 3-11  (3d ed. 
2015) (explaining that factors to be disclosed include diagnosis, nature and 
purpose of treatment, risks of treatment and, in some circumstances 
comparative data on the treating physician’s skills, alternatives to the 
proposed treatment, prognosis with and without the treatment, and conflicts 
of interest). 
27
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is, however, only as good as the quality and accuracy of the 
information on which the consent is based and the individual 
decision maker’s ability to comprehend and process that 
information.  The scope of required disclosure varies by 
jurisdiction, but typically follows one of two models, with states 
about evenly divided between the two.71  In states that have 
adopted the professional standard of disclosure, physicians 
must disclose all information that a reasonable physician 
would disclose under the circumstances.72  In jurisdictions that 
follow the patient-oriented standard, the physician must 
disclose what a reasonable patient would want to know under 
the circumstances.73 
 
71. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., LAW AND HEALTH CARE QUALITY, 
PATIENT SAFETY, AND MEDICAL LIABILITY 195 (7th ed. 2013). 
72. See, e.g., Tashman v. Gibbs, 556 S.E.2d 772, 777 (Va. 2002) 
(explaining that “[a] physician has a duty in the exercise of ordinary care to 
inform a patient of the dangers of, possible negative consequences of, and 
alternatives to a proposed medical treatment or procedure. To recover against 
a physician for failure to provide such information, the patient generally is 
required to establish by expert testimony whether and to what extent any 
information should have been disclosed.”); see also FURROW ET AL. , supra note 
70, at § 3-10(a) (describing the physician-based standard of disclosure). 
73. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972); 
Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1972); see also FURROW ET AL., supra note 70, 
at § 3-10(b) (describing the reasonable patient standard of disclosure).  As the 
Canterbury opinion explains, disclosure should include a number of elements: 
 
The cases demonstrate that the physician is under an 
obligation to communicate specific information to the 
patient when the exigencies of reasonable care call for it.  
Due care may require a physician perceiving symptoms of 
bodily abnormality to alert the patient to the condition. It 
may call upon the physician confronting an ailment that 
does not respond to his ministrations to inform the patient 
thereof.  It may command the physician to instruct the 
patient as to any limitations to be presently observed for his 
own welfare, and as to any precautionary therapy he should 
seek in the future.  It may oblige the physician to advise the 
patient of the need for or desirability of any alternative 
treatment promising greater benefit than that being 
pursued.  Just as plainly, due care normally demands that 
the physician warn the patient of any risks to his well-being 
which contemplated therapy may involve. 
 
Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789. Although the two standards have varying 
effects on the plaintiff’s burden of proof, these effects are not relevant for 
purposes of this discussion.  It is also worth noting that documentation of 
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/2
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When a patient is asked to make an informed decision to 
consent to, say, a surgical procedure to remove his gall bladder, 
the physician will describe the purpose of the surgery, its risks 
and benefits, and alternatives to the procedure, if any, and the 
patient then will sign a consent form indicating a willingness to 
undergo the surgery.  In the context of decisions about whether 
to provide life-prolonging care to a dying patient, however, the 
consent process becomes more complicated.  When a dying 
patient has not expressed any preferences about life-prolonging 
technology and has lost decisional capacity, the decision 
defaults to a proxy or family member who may, for various 
reasons, hesitate to refuse proffered life-prolonging care.74  In 
these cases, the proxy or surrogate decision maker may agree 
to, for example, intubation or artificial nutrition and hydration, 
and may sign a consent form after receiving information about 
the purpose, risks, and benefits of these interventions—not 
because the surrogate believes that this is what the patient 
would want, but rather because feelings of grief, guilt, or other 
emotions make it more difficult to refuse life-prolonging 
treatment on behalf of a loved one than to consent to it.  The 
surrogate thus provides legally valid consent, but based on a 
potentially misplaced understanding of what is in the patient’s 
best interests rather than on what the patient, if able, would 
choose.75 Thus, the operation of the usual consent process 
 
informed consent via the patient’s or surrogate’s signature on a form simply 
memorializes the prior consent discussion between physician and patient—
the signed form itself does not constitute “informed consent.” Id. at 780 n. 15. 
74. It is important to note that the role of surrogate and proxy decision 
makers is not limited to making decisions for dying patients.  Proxies and 
surrogates are asked to make medical decisions in any context (including 
non-terminal situations) in which the patient has lost decisional capacity. 
75. There are also good arguments for considering the potential 
motivations of legally appointed health care proxies differently from the 
motivations of surrogates who assume the role because they are the first 
available person in the hierarchy of decision-making.  In the case of proxies 
who have been duly appointed by the now-incapacitated patient, there is 
arguably more cause for confidence that the proxy will decide based on the 
patient’s wishes, particularly if the patient has instructed the proxy as to his 
wishes.  The very fact of the appointment suggests that the patient has 
placed his trust in the proxy.  In contrast, we might be less inclined to trust 
the instructions of a person who serves as a surrogate based on a state 
statutory hierarchy of surrogate decision-making to reflect a decision based 
on the patient’s choice rather than on the surrogate’s assessment of the 
patient’s best interests.  In any event, recent evidence suggests that, even 
29
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means that, for patients who do not clearly opt out of life-
prolonging treatment before losing decisional capacity, the path 
of least resistance can lead to decisions in favor of initiating or 
continuing life-prolonging care.  As explained above, courts 
have endorsed this default path by ruling in favor of continuing 
life-prolonging care in cases of uncertainty about the patient’s 
preference.76  Physicians can, of course, simply decline to 
discuss and proffer life-prolonging options for dying patients 
where they think it clinically inappropriate, but, as the 
discussion in Part I illustrates, the current reality of end-of-life 
care makes this challenging. 
The law sends conflicting signals to physicians regarding 
the management of patient care at the end of life. On the one 
hand, physicians do have an ethical and legal obligation to 
avoid providing treatments that are harmful to patients or are 
inconsistent with their wishes. Courts have recognized this 
obligation and have awarded damages against physicians and 
institutions for providing treatment contrary to patients’ 
wishes.77  Conversely, many state statutes insulate physicians 
from liability for patient deaths that result from withdrawal of 
life-sustaining treatment as requested by a patient’s advance 
directive.78  On the other hand, despite this apparent protection 
 
when patients appoint a health care proxy, there is little change in the 
utilization of end-of-life treatment.  See Amol K. Narang et al., Trends in 
Advance Care Planning in Patients With Cancer: Results from a National 
Longitudinal Survey, 1 J. AM. MED. ASS'N E5-E6 (2015) (finding that 
assignment of proxies or durable powers of attorney for health care was not 
associated with decisions to limit aggressive care at the end of life). 
76. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
77. See, e.g., Estate of Leach v. Shapiro, 469 N.E.2d 1047 (Ohio Ct. App. 
1984) (recognizing a civil cause of action for wrongful continuation of life 
supportive measures); but see Anderson v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp., Inc., 
671 N.E.2d 225 (Ohio 1996) (rejecting a “wrongful living” claim based on 
hospital’s resuscitation of patient after he had requested a succeeded in 
having a “no code blue” order placed in his chart and holding that “continued 
living” is not a compensable injury); see also Allore v. Flower Hosp., 699 
N.E.2d 560 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (refusing to recognize a battery claim for 
intubation and ventilation of a dying patient contrary to his advance directive 
and the statements of his health care proxy and citing Anderson with 
approval and critiquing the court’s decision in Leach). 
78. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 765.109 (2015) (“A health care facility, 
provider, or other person who acts under the direction of a health care facility 
or provider is not subject to criminal prosecution or civil liability, and will not 
be deemed to have engaged in unprofessional conduct, as a result of carrying 
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/2
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of patient autonomy when the patient has expressed a 
preference, many states have enacted conscience clause 
legislation, which allows a physician to transfer the care of a 
patient when compliance with that person’s advance directive 
would conflict with the physician’s conscience.79  In addition, 
case law suggests that many states adopt a position of erring 
on the side of continued treatment in cases of uncertainty or 
disagreement about the patient’s choice.80 
This state of affairs which, as we have seen, often results 
in overutilization of care at the end of life, may seem to follow 
from the autonomy principle, but in fact it results from a 
stunted or overly mechanistic view of the physician’s role in 
guiding end-of-life decision making.  Physicians are rarely 
called upon to make the actual decision about whether to 
withdraw life-sustaining medical treatment, and even if the 
patient or surrogate requests that the physician decide, the 
physician has an ethical obligation to do so based on an 
understanding of the particular patient’s values and goals of 
 
out a health care decision made in accordance with the provisions of this 
chapter.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-J:12(II)(a) (2015) (“No health care 
provider . . . shall be subjected to civil or criminal liability or be deemed to 
have engaged in unprofessional conduct for . . .  [a]ny act or intentional 
failure to act, if . . . done pursuant to the dictates of an advance directive . . . 
.”). 
79. See  A.B.A. Myths and Facts About Health Care Advance Directives, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Commissions/myths_f
act_hc_ad.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited March 28, 2016); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 137-J:7(I)(D) (“If a physician . . .  because of his or her personal beliefs 
or conscience, is unable to comply with the terms of the advance directive or 
surrogate's decision, he or she shall immediately inform the qualified patient, 
the qualified patient's family, or the qualified patient's agent. The qualified 
patient, or the qualified patient's agent or family, may then request that the 
case be referred to another physician  . . . .”); see also FURROW ET AL., supra 
note 70, at § 16-21 (discussing statutory protections from liability for 
compliance with advance directives and statutory inclusion of conscience 
clauses).  Nevertheless, some commentators have advocated for the legal 
enforcement of these documents.   See generally Andrew J. Broder, She Don’t 
Want No Life Support: A Summary of Osgood and Other Developments in 
Michigan Since Martin, 75 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 595-605 (1998); NORMAN L. 
CANTOR, ADVANCE DIRECTIVES AND THE PURSUIT OF DEATH WITH DIGNITY 130-
34 (Indiana University Press 1993); Adam A. Milani, Better Off Dead than 
Disabled?: Should Courts Recognize a "Wrongful Living" Cause of Action 
When Doctors Fail to Honor Patients' Advance Directives?, 54 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 149 (1997). 
80. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
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care.81  Physicians instead usually are asked to implement 
decisions made by patients (directly or via advance directives) 
or their proxies.  Because the autonomy principle focuses on 
the patient’s preferences, the physician can, if he or she 
chooses, avoid the more complex discussion of whether 
continuing treatment serves the patient’s best interests as a 
medical matter, even if the patient consents to that treatment.  
As commentators have observed: 
 
Responsibility for medical care has landed on the 
shoulders of patients with a resounding thud.  
Patients have the choice of telling physicians 
what to do in relation to health care decisions.  
The tone of medical practice has shifted from 
paternalistic to consultative, in which the 
physician lays the possibilities before the patient, 
with the potential pluses and minuses of each, 
and the patient makes a choice.82 
 
Under most circumstances, if a patient or surrogate requests 
continued treatment or life-prolonging interventions, the 
physician can simply acquiesce (assuming the requested 
intervention is not futile as a scientific matter).  But where the 
requested intervention is arguably not in the patient’s best 
interests, mere acquiescence debases the physician’s role.  
Because the physician is responsible for the patient’s well-
being, the physician has an ethical and legal obligation to help 
the patient or surrogate decision maker understand the risks, 
potential outcomes, and alternatives associated with the 
requested intervention, not just its purpose. In some 
 
81. For an interesting case study of a situation in which the patient 
delegated the decision about whether to have CABG surgery to his physician, 
see Alan W. Cross & Larry R. Churchill, Ethical and Cultural Dimensions of 
Informed Consent: A Case Study and Analysis, 96 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 
110, 110-12 (1982) (explaining that in this “paternalism with permission” 
situation, consent is not invalidated but rather requires the physician to 
“gain as complete an understanding as possible fo the patient’s values, 
culture, and life-style . . . [to] appreciate the larger significance fo the 
treatment choice for the patient.”). 
82. See Paterick et al., supra note 69, at 318 (adding that “[w]hen it 
comes to medical treatment, patients see choice as a burden and a blessing.”). 
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circumstances physicians, while acknowledging that the 
decision remains the patient’s, will have an ethical obligation 
to opine as to what is in the patient’s best medical interests 
and to discuss this opinion in the context of the patient’s 
expressed wishes.83  Ideally, the goal is to help the patient or 
surrogate make a decision that is consistent with the patient’s 
goals of care as well as the patient’s broader values, 
preferences, and beliefs, so that the decision is truly informed, 
as both the law and the ethical principle of autonomy require. 
This is no easy task.  To start, these discussions often 
occur at the point of decision rather than in advance, leaving 
little time for reflection.  The presence of relatives may 
heighten emotions or tensions, particularly if the relatives 
disagree with the patient’s or surrogate’s choices.  In addition 
to being emotionally challenging, decisions about whether and 
when to cease curative care and whether to begin or to 
withdraw life-prolonging technology are inherently complex as 
a scientific matter.  Physicians and patients want to make the 
“best” choices about medical care for terminal illness but 
obviously lack the omniscience needed to calculate future 
possibilities without error. The ability of physicians and 
patients to make rational calculations about the comparative 
desirability of various options is limited not only by the 
imperfections of predictive data on therapeutic response, 
adverse effects, and prognosis, among other things, but also by 
their limited abilities to process the available information 
rationally.84 Although it is impossible to eliminate uncertainty 
about treatment decisions, physicians can provide more 
guidance and more accurate information about the relative 
merits of various options for individual patients than they 
 
83. The ethical principle of beneficence, which operates alongside the 
primary principle of autonomy, requires that physicians which requires that 
physicians provide that care which is in their patients’ best medical interests.  
See JOHN C. FLETCHER ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO CLINICAL ETHICS 12 (2d ed. 
1997) (describing beneficence as the “obligation to benefit patients . . . and to 
further their welfare and interests”). 
84. Cf. Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. 
J. ECON. 99-118 (1955) (describing the limitations of individuals to process 
information due to limited data and limitations of intellectual calculative 
abilities as “bounded rationality”); see generally JEROME GROOPMAN, HOW 
DOCTORS THINK (Houghton Mifflin Comp. 2007) (discussing clinical 
uncertainty in diagnosis and treatment recommendations). 
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typically do now.  And, as explained above, what constitutes 
“best” for a patient will vary depending on whether the patient 
evaluates quality based on the likely effectiveness of the care in 
achieving its medical goals or on how the care comports with 
the patient’s own values. 
It is important to avoid shortcuts in these conversations.  
For example, statistical life expectancy values based on past 
experience with similar populations provide a snapshot of 
population trends, but it is difficult to assess their relevance to 
any particular patient’s situation.  There is often no way to 
predict whether a particular patient will, on the one hand, 
outlive the statistical projection for life expectancy or, on the 
other hand, die much sooner than the average.85  Similarly, 
prognosis for meaningful recovery in many medical 
circumstances, such as for stroke patients, requires a 
discussion between physician and patient of complex variables 
such as the likelihood that the patient will regain various 
degrees of physical function.86 
And these conversations are not simply about prognosis. 
Physicians also must recognize that patients frequently fail to 
understand the likely curative value of certain invasive 
treatments, either because this information is not included in 
the discussion or because it is impossible to predict with any 
 
85. See George A. Diamond, Future Imperfect: The Limitations of 
Clinical Prediction Models and the Limits of Clinical Prediction, 14 J. AM. 
COLL. OF CARDIOLOGY A12, A12-22 (1989) (describing different ways in which 
statistical regressive models to predict clinical outcomes can go awry).  
Courts also have recognized the limitations of statistical prognoses in the 
context of defining boundaries of informed consent.  See, e.g., Arato v. 
Avedon, 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993) (“[S]tatistical life expectancy data had little 
predictive value when applied to a particular patient with individualized 
symptoms, medical history, character traits, and other variables.”). 
86. A meta-analysis of data from multiple studies on the recovery of 
stroke patients who were receiving mechanical ventilation found that 
prognosis was generally poor, with 58% of these patients dying within 30 
days, but that a minority of patients survived without severe disability.  See 
Robert G. Holloway et al., Prognosis and Decision Making in Severe Stroke, 
294 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 725, 727-28 & tbl. 1 (2005).  The authors of this study 
caution that physicians can be unrealistically optimistic or pessimistic in 
various circumstances and that physicians should think carefully about how 
they convey prognostic evidence.  See id. at 729 & tbl. 3 (offering the example 
of a surgical intervention giving a person “a 50% chance at a better outcome” 
versus that same intervention increasing the person’s chance “of improved 
outcome from 5% to 7.5%”). 
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accuracy the effects of the treatment on a particular patient.  
With respect to chemotherapy for metastatic cancer, one study 
found that 69% of patients with lung cancer and 81% of 
patients with colorectal cancer mistakenly believed that the 
chemotherapy they were receiving was likely to cure their 
disease.87  The problem with this unrealistic expectation of cure 
is that patients will be more likely to consent to treatment that, 
while it may palliate symptoms or even extend life, is also 
likely to cause significant toxic effects that will impair quality 
of life.  Patients who understand that chemotherapy under 
these circumstances cannot cure their illness and will at best 
have a palliative effect on it may weigh the value of this 
treatment differently and may be more likely to decline it.  The 
conversation between physician and patient that is needed to 
evaluate the patient’s level of understanding in these 
circumstances is likely to be as challenging as any conversation 
about poor prognosis. 
Simply presenting patients with statistics about likely 
prognoses and side effects of various treatment options is a 
poor substitute for the broader responsibility to the patient to 
discuss the reality of the patient’s particular situation (as far 
as it can be known) and the available options.  The challenge 
for physicians is to present information that will allow patients 
and families to make informed decisions and to guide those 
decisions with the physician’s expert judgment about the best 
course of action without overwhelming patients with unwanted 
or confusing data.88  Of course, some physicians will resist such 
conversations, either because of their personal moral or 
religious views or because they find this sort of communication 
too difficult. 
In sum, the process and substance that constitutes 
 
87. See Jane C. Weeks et al., Patients’ Expectations About Effects of 
Chemotherapy for Advanced Cancer, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1616, 1619 (2012) 
(noting that, “[p]aradoxically, patients who reported higher scores for 
physician communication were also at higher risk for inaccurate 
expectations” regarding the curative potential of chemotherapy).  
88. See C. Alifrangis et al., The Experiences of Cancer Patients, 104 Q. J. 
MED. 1075, 1079-80 (2011) (emphasizing the need for physicians to take the 
lead and ask what individual patients would like to know before providing 
detailed information about prognosis, efficacy of proposed therapy and 
related matters). 
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“informed consent” satisfies physicians’ and health care 
institutions’ legal obligations: If the patient receives 
comprehensible information about the relevant decision 
through an appropriate process and then makes a choice, the 
physician and institution are insulated from liability for 
providing (or withholding) continued therapy or life-prolonging 
medical treatment.  But mere compliance with legal informed 
consent requirements does not ensure that patients’ end of life 
choices are truly informed; as a consequence, many patients 
continue to receive care in excess of what they would have 
chosen had they fully understood their options and more 
thoroughly considered, together with their physicians and 
family members, how those options comport with their values. 
Two relatively recent developments in the clinical decision 
making process seek to address some of the limitations of 
relying solely on the mechanics of informed consent doctrine.  
The first is shared decision making (SDM).89  The SDM model 
recognizes and respects patient autonomy while 
simultaneously acknowledging the physician’s responsibility 
for the patient’s well-being.90  It represents an effort to include 
the patient more actively in the process of making complex 
medical choices, including choices about end-of-life care.91  
Rather than viewing informed consent as a rigid two-step 
process in which the physician provides information and the 
patient then makes a decision—a burdensome model for many 
 
89. See, e.g., Institute of Medicine, Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New 
Health System for the 21st Century (2001), 
https://www.iom.edu/~/media/Files/Report%20Files/2001/Crossing-the-
Quality-Chasm/Quality%20Chasm%202001%20%20report%20brief.pdf 
(advocating shared decision-making in the form of emphasis on the patient’s 
values and beliefs and encouraging the open exchange of information 
between physician and patient); see also Cathy Charles et al., Shared 
Decision-Making in the Medical Encounter: What Does It Mean? (or It takes at 
Least Two to Tango), 44 SOC. SCI. MED. 681 (1997) (advocating improved 
clarity as to what is meant by the term “shared decision making”); Jaime 
Staples King & Benjamin Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case 
for Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J. L. & MED. 429 (2006). 
90. Alan Meisel & Mark Kuczewski, Legal and Ethical Myths About 
Informed Consent, 156 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2521, 2522 (1996). 
91. See Chuck Alston, et al., Shared Decision-Making Strategies for Best 
Care: Patient Decision Aids NAT’L ACAD. OF MED. (2014), 
http://nam.edu/perspectives-2014-shared-decision-making-strategies-for-best-
care-patient-decision-aids/. 
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patients, as suggested above—SDM “does not restrict the 
physician to providing the facts and insist[] that the patient 
supply all the values.  The physician and the patient each have 
access to interrelated facts and values.”92 
As part of or in addition to SDM, decision aids can play an 
important role in helping patients comprehend complex 
medical information more easily.93  Decision aids come in 
multiple forms, including videos and interactive computer 
programs.94  Decision aids have been around for some time, but 
appear to be proliferating as information technology advances 
and becomes more widely accessible.  They have multiple goals, 
including explaining patients’ options and the risks and 
benefits of various choices in accessible, jargon-free language, 
helping patients to articulate the goals or outcomes that are 
most important to them, and guiding patients through the 
steps to making choices consistent with their values.95  
Decision aids are particularly useful in assisting patients to 
make decisions about “preference-sensitive” medical care—care 
for medical situations in which multiple reasonable options 
exist96 and the goal is to help patients make a choice that 
 
92. See Meisel & Kuczewski, supra note 90, at 2522; see also Michael J. 
Barry & Susan Edgman-Levitan, Shared Decision Making—The Pinnacle of 
Patient-Centered Care, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 780, 781 (2012) (explaining 
that, in shared decision making, “both parties share information: the 
clinician offers options and describes their risks and benefits, and the patient 
expresses his or her preferences and values.  Each participant is thus armed 
with a better understanding of the relevant factors and shares responsibility 
in the decision about how to proceed.”). 
93. See Annette M. O’Connor et al., Toward the ‘Tipping Point’: Decision 
Aids and Informed Patient Choice, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 716, 717-18 (2007); 
See also Jonathan Rauch, How Not to Die, THE ATLANTIC, May 2013, at 64-66 
(profiling the efforts of Dr. Angelo Volandes, a professor at Harvard Medical 
School, who makes brief but graphic informational videos to educate patients 
about the rigors of interventions such as cardiopulmonary resuscitation and 
mechanical ventilation). 
94. For a selection of decision aids, see Decision Aids, DARTMOUTH-
HITCHCOCK, http://www.dartmouth-hitchcock.org/medical-
information/decision_aids.html. 
95. See O’Connor, supra note 93, at 717. 
96. See Barry & Edgman-Levitan, supra note 92, at 780 (explaining that, 
for some medical conditions, “there is one clearly superior path, and patient 
preferences play little or no role . . . For most medical decisions, however, 
more than one reasonable path forward exists (including the option of doing 
nothing, when appropriate), and different paths entail different combinations 
. . . effects . . . . In such cases, patient involvement in decision making adds 
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comports with the patient’s own ideas of benefits and harms.97  
For these reasons, decision aids appear well suited to assist 
patients and surrogates with complex end-of- life decisions. 
Both SDM and decision aids can help advance end-of-life 
decision making beyond the bare requirements of informed 
consent law, reducing excess treatment and leading to care 
that more often comports with patients’ truly informed wishes.  
Both SDM and decision aids add an extra dimension to the 
decision making process and, if used properly, require 
additional interaction between physician and patient.  In this 
respect, both developments can improve on the unfortunately 
common practice of having only minimal discussions about end-
of-life planning or avoiding those discussions altogether.  In the 
next part of this paper, we pursue further how these 
techniques can contribute to improved physician-patient 
communication. 
 
III. Improving Communication Between  
Physicians and Patients 
 
Informed consent is and will remain the legal standard for 
medical decision making, including decisions at the end of life.  
But the physician-patient relationship obviously consists of 
more than the delivery of tests and treatments with the 
patient’s “informed consent.”  Unfortunately, physicians often 
lack training “in recognizing and accepting the process of 
dying, managing pain and other symptoms adequately, and 
attending to the emotional needs of the dying and their 
families.”98  Moving beyond this treatment-focused model to a 
 
substantial value.”); Simon N. Whitney et al., A Typology of Shared Decision 
Making, Informed Consent, and Simple Consent, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 
54, 55-56 (2004) (observing that shared decision making makes the most 
sense “only when real choice exists and the physician involves the patient in 
the decision” and suggesting categories of consent and decision making and 
zones of overlap between the two concepts). 
97. See O’Connor et al., supra note 93, at 716; see also John E. Wennberg 
& Philip G. Peters, Unwanted Variations in the Quality of Health Care: Can 
the Law Help Medicine Provide a Remedy/Remedies?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 925, 930-35 (2002). 
98. See James R. Patterson & Marion O. Hodges, Letter to the Editor, 
338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1389 (1998) (adding that “[i]t is sad that our care of the 
dying has lagged behind other forms of medical care, justifying the fear of 
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genuine relationship involving trust, truthfulness, and caring 
for the patient as a person (rather than as a diagnosis) requires 
that all parties be willing to talk openly about the dying 
process and to share the burden of making decisions in a 
context rife with ambivalence and emotion.  Given the 
complexity of the information involved, informed consent in the 
end-of-life context should be an ongoing conversation that 
evolves as the situation progresses and gives the patient or 
surrogate an opportunity to discuss care preferences as the 
need arises.  Although the current pattern of overutilization of 
care at the end of life suggests that these conversations happen 
less often and in less detail than they should, there are some 
ways to encourage this sort of SDM process between physicians 
and patients. 
Before seeking informed consent for life-prolonging care, 
physicians must first consider whether the proposed care is 
potentially inappropriate or “futile.”99  Subjective futility 
questions may lead to disagreement among health care 
providers and patients and families about the appropriate 
point to discontinue or withhold therapeutic or life-supportive 
interventions.100  There is, however, unsettling evidence that 
physicians knowingly provide treatments that they 
conclusively believe to be futile for the patient.101  At least in 
 
many persons that they will not be able to die with dignity and comfort.  Our 
emphasis must be on providing the necessary training.”). 
99. For more detailed discussion of futility questions, see generally 
Robert D. Truog et al., The Problem with Futility, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1560, 1561 (1992); Robert D. Truog, Medical Futility, 25 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
985 (2009); Lawrence J. Schneiderman, Defining Medical Futility and 
Improving Medical Care, 8 J. BIOETHICAL INQUIRY 123, 123-31 (2011). 
100. See supra notes 99 – 102 and accompanying text (discussing cases 
in which futility disputes required judicial resolution). 
101. See Huynh, supra note 11, at E3-E6 (finding, in a survey of 
clinicians caring for critically ill patients, that while 80% of the patients were 
not thought to be receiving futile treatment, 8.6% were perceived as receiving 
probably futile treatment and 11% were thought to be receiving treatment 
that was definitely futile).  Not only did the authors conclude that the costs of 
this probably or definitely futile care were substantial, they also 
acknowledged that “the burdens to patients, families, and clinicians also 
deserve attention.”  Id. at E7.  The term “futile” has been much criticized in 
recent years.  Commentators now recommend using the term “potentially 
inappropriate care” or “inappropriate care” in order better to capture the idea 
of treatments that may have some chance off success but for which clinicians 
worry that “the treatment is highly unlikely to be successful, is extremely 
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these cases, the physician could choose to discuss the matter 
with the patient or surrogate decision maker in order to 
explain why the treatment is arguably medically inappropriate, 
rather than simply providing the treatment and avoiding the 
discussion and the possibility of conflict.102 In the case of 
genuine disagreement over the appropriateness of a particular 
treatment, the physician is placed in an even more difficult 
situation.103  Without guidance about an individual patient’s 
beliefs regarding continued life-supportive measures, it is 
difficult to know when to cease providing support to a person 
whose condition will not improve. 
Conversations about end-of-life care feature yet another 
layer of complexity.  Although most patients want to know 
whether their disease is curable and, if not, how long they can 
expect to live,104 the autonomy principle and the law of 
informed consent recognize the right of patients not to 
participate in their medical decisions.105  While physicians have 
 
expensive, or is intended to achieve a goal of controversial value.”  See Bosslet 
et al., supra note 51, at 1319, 1322-33. 
102. We do not address here the separate question of whether physicians 
should override patient and surrogate decisions in cases where the physician 
believes continued treatment to be futile but the patient or surrogate 
demands continued treatment.  Other commentators have ably addressed 
these issues.  See, e.g., Eric Gampel, Does Professional Autonomy Protect 
Medical Futility Judgments?, 20 BIOETHICS 92, 92-104 (2006).  Instead, we 
focus on the question of what physicians can and should do in response to 
requests for medically inappropriate treatment. 
103. For a detailed set of suggestions aimed at preventing and/or 
resolving treatment conflicts via “proactive communication,” see Bosslet et 
al., supra note 51, at 1320-24 (recommending a series of steps to resolve 
disputes with surrogate decision makers including the use of experts in 
mediation and negation, seeking a second medical opinion, seeking review by 
a hospital ethics committee, offering the option of transferring the patient to 
another institution, and informing surrogates of the possibility of judicial 
review). 
104. See, e.g., Alifrangis, supra note 88, at 1077-79 (concluding, based on 
survey data, that only 66% of patients in the U.K. wanted to be given a 
prognosis and 12% said that they would not want to be told that they had a 
short time to live); Rebecca C. Hagerty et al., Communicating with Realism 
and Hope: Incurable Cancer Patients’ Views on the Disclosure of Prognosis, 23 
J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY. 1278 (2005) (finding that 98% of Australian patients 
surveyed preferred to receive realistic information about prognosis); Belinda 
E. Kiely et al., Thinking and Talking About Life Expectancy in Incurable 
Cancer, 38 SEMINARS IN  ONCOLOGY 380 (2011). 
105. The U.S. law of informed consent and the ethical principle of self-
determination on which it is based allow patients to reject information as 
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no ethical or legal obligation to force patients to engage in these 
discussions, this does not provide an excuse to sidestep the 
conversation altogether.  In situations where the patient has 
not specifically declined to discuss his or her medical situation, 
the physician must be more proactive in initiating discussions 
about end of life care. 
Better training in communication with patients and 
families can help physicians become more skilled in initiating 
and having these very challenging discussions. Institutional or 
organizational guidelines can help to promote best practices, 
including SDM.  In addition, the use of decision aids can 
provide a basis for patients and physicians to discuss the 
advisability of particular interventions and can improve 
patients’ comprehension of and active participation in complex 
medical decisions.  The POLST paradigm, also described below, 
offers another promising framework for discussion between 
physicians and terminally ill patients.  There are limitations to 
all of these interventions, but all can improve the quality of 
medical decision making, whether gauged objectively in terms 
of outcomes, or subjectively, in terms of patient preferences. 
 
A. Physician Training to Improve Communication 
 
Better physician training regarding communication about 
prognosis, treatment options, withdrawal and withholding of 
life-sustaining care, and palliative and hospice care is sorely 
needed.106  In order to change the habits and practices of 
 
well as to receive it.  See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. 
Cir. 1972) (describing an exception to the rule of informed consent in 
circumstances where “risk-disclosure poses such a threat of detriment to the 
patient as to become unfeasible or contraindicated from a medical point of 
view”). This “therapeutic privilege” not to disclose certainly would provide 
support to a physician who chooses not to discuss prognosis and end of life 
choices with a patient who declines to have the discussion; see also Meisel & 
Kuczewski, supra note 90, at 2525 (“Withholding information from patients 
when they request that it not be given respects their autonomy as much as 
providing information to patients who want it . . . .  Withholding information 
from patients at their request is a legally recognized exception to informed 
consent referred to as a waiver.”). 
106. See Neil J. Farber et al., Physicians’ Decisions to Withhold and 
Withdraw Life-Sustaining Treatment, 166 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 560, 563 
(2006) (noting that lack of training about the ethical and legal issues may 
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physicians, education should begin in medical school.  Young 
physicians in training are frequently eager to discuss ethical 
challenges and are open to debate about best practices.107  
Identification and directed discussion of problems in end of life 
care during clinical training, along with instructors who model 
good communication with patients, can achieve incremental 
change.  And, of course, continuing medical education that 
trains practicing physicians regarding best practices and the 
need for frank communication with patients and families about 
end-of-life choices can provide physicians with the tools to 
initiate and conduct these conversations under challenging 
circumstances. 
For many physicians, these conversations feel daunting.  A 
number of excellent publications suggest specific approaches to 
discussing end of life treatment, particularly topics such as 
ceasing active therapy, the transition to hospice, and 
withdrawing or withholding life-sustaining treatments.108  
 
lead to dissent among physicians when patients request that care be withheld 
or withdrawn). 
107. We base this claim on one author’s own multi-year experience as 
part of a team teaching “Ethical and Legal Issues in the Practice of Medicine” 
at a large medical school.  The course was offered in the first semester of the 
second year and consisted of weekly one-hour lectures followed by one or 
more hours of small group discussion, led by faculty, centering around how to 
resolve a clinical ethics dispute in the context of law, ethics, and feasible 
medical options.  The students in these small groups debated the issues 
avidly and often left the room continuing the discussion.  They also were 
frequently incredulous about the law’s limitations in dealing with complex 
ethical dilemmas in health care. 
108. There is a wealth of literature that proposes and discusses such 
frameworks for these conversations.  See, e.g., NANCY BERLINGER, ET AL., THE 
HASTINGS CENTER GUIDELINES FOR DECISIONS ON LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 
AND CARE NEAR THE END OF LIFE (2d ed. 2013); KATY BUTLER, KNOCKING ON 
HEAVEN’S DOOR: THE PATH TO A BETTER WAY OF DEATH (2013); Jim deMaine & 
Joi Murotani Dennett, Communicating with Patients and Families About 
Difficult End of Life Decisions: A Guide for Medical Providers, 36 HAMLINE L. 
REV. 299 (2013); R. M. Epstein et al., Communicating Evidence for 
Participatory Decision Making, 291 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2359, 2362 (2004) 
(reviewing the literature to identify research that guides physicians in 
communicating with their patients about end of life choices and 
recommending five communication tasks to facilitate good discussion between 
physician and patient); Dale G. Larson & Daniel R. Tobin, End-of-Life 
Conversations: Evolving Practice and Theory, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1573, 
1576-77 (2000) (urging that end of life conversations become a routine part of 
health care and that advance care planning function as a key aspect of these 
discussions); Quyen Ngo-Metzger et al., End-of-Life Care: Guidelines for 
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Many guidelines for end-of-life conversation recommend that 
physicians begin by asking the patient what he or she would 
like to know about the illness and prognosis.109  For example, 
the American Society of Clinical Oncology has published a “best 
practices” model that recommends a series of conversations 
with patients with terminal cancer diagnoses, with content to 
reflect the patient’s evolving medical condition.110  One large 
facility that implemented this best practices model found that 
it doubled the length of patient participation in hospice care 
and decreased total costs while maintaining survival rates.111 
Curricula designed to teach physicians skills for 
conversation with patients also are available.  The American 
Academy on Communication in Healthcare and the Association 
for Behavioral Sciences in Medical Education are among 
 
Patient-Centered Communication, 77 AM. FAM. PHYSICIAN 167 (2008); 
Timothy E. Quill, Initiating End-of-Life Discussions With Seriously Ill 
Patients: Addressing the “Elephant in the Room”, 284 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2502, 
2503-04 (2000) (providing a list of clinical indications for discussing end of life 
care, including imminent death, talk about wanting to die, inquiries about 
hospice, recent hospitalization for severe progressive illness, severe suffering, 
questions about prognosis, discussing treatment with low probability of 
success, discussing hopes and fears, and in cases where the physician would 
not be surprised if the patient died within 6-12 months). 
109. For example, one commentator advises that physicians ask what 
the patient wants to know and then tell the truth in an understandable and 
clear way about the time that the patient may have left and what he or she 
can expect.  See Thomas J. Smith & Dan L. Longo, Talking with Patients 
About Dying, 367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1651 (2012).  Another commentator 
proposed a five step sequential approach to communication with dying 
patients and their families, beginning with consent for an initial trial of 
treatment, and addressing topics such as treatment failure, stopping 
treatment, and requests for arguably futile treatment.  See Stephen 
Workman, A Communication Model for Encouraging Optimal Care at the 
End of Life for Hospitalized Patients, 100 Q. J. MED. 791, 792-94 (2007). 
110. See Thomas J. Smith et al., American Society of Clinical Oncology 
Provisional Clinical Opinion: The Integration of Palliative Care into 
Standard Oncology Care, 20 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 880, 880 (2012) (“While a 
survival benefit from early involvement of palliative care has not yet been 
demonstrated in other oncology settings, substantial evidence demonstrates 
that palliative care—when combined with standard cancer care or as the 
main focus of care—leads to better patient and caregiver outcomes. These 
include improvement in symptoms, QOL, and patient satisfaction, with 
reduced caregiver burden. Earlier involvement of palliative care also leads to 
more appropriate referral to and use of hospice, and reduced use of futile 
intensive care.”). 
111. Id. at 881-82. 
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several organizations that have developed evidence-based 
clinical teaching exercises designed to improve the physician-
patient encounter.112  Physicians and medical students who 
complete these sorts of courses can learn to incorporate 
empathy and listening skills into their relationships with 
patients.113  These efforts should also reach beyond physicians 
to other non-physician health care providers, as well as social 
workers and related professionals.  Again, some of this is 
happening already, but making this type of training routine (or 
even mandating it for certain specialties) may help to 
accelerate change.  And, if multiple members of a team or 
department incorporate these values into their interactions 
with patients and families, it will reinforce best practices and 
model them for any providers who remain reluctant. 
“How to” articles, guidelines, and courses provide a useful 
tool for training, but still do not bridge the gap between theory 
and practice.  Physicians still may hesitate to take the lead.  
Yet they have an ethical and clinical obligation to initiate these 
discussions, even though the ultimate decision making 
authority lies with the patient or surrogate decision maker.  
Physicians may worry that discussing these matters with 
patients will generate anxiety or may give the patient or family 
the idea that the physician is abandoning care of the patient,114 
 
112. See AM. ACAD. ON COMMC’N IN HEALTHCARE, 
http://www.aachonline.org (last visited Mar. 28, 2016); ASS’N FOR THE 
BEHAVIORAL SCIS. & MED. ED.,  http://www.absame.org/About-ABSAME (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2016) (providing information and resources for medical 
school and continuing medical education curricula). 
113. See Daniel F. Duffy, Dialogue: The Core Clinical Skill, 128 ANNALS 
INTERNAL MED. 139, 140 (1998) (discussing evidence suggesting that 
physician traits such as empathy and listening improve the patient 
treatment encounter). 
114. Cf. Steven Z. Pantilat, Communicating With Seriously Ill Patients: 
Better Words to Say, 301 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1279, 1279 (2009) (explaining that 
recent research on physician-patient communication emphasizes the value of 
a model that involves multiple conversations over time and that offers the 
prospect of continued care, even if active therapy to cure the disease no 
longer makes sense); Quill, supra note 108, at 2503 (“Timely, sensitive 
discussions with seriously ill patients regarding medical, psychosocial, and 
spiritual needs at the end of life are both an obligation of and privilege for 
every physician.”); Larson & Tobin, supra note 108, at 1575 (“[D]iscussing 
palliative care issues while disease-remitting treatments are continued 
without creating a perception of abandonment requires the utmost empathy 
and skill.”). 
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but they need to recognize the importance of these 
conversations and to proceed, gently.  Recent studies 
demonstrate that surrogate decision makers also frequently 
experience stress and anxiety during and well after the process 
of making treatment decisions for a family member.115  Some 
physicians have acknowledged this concern and are willing to 
take on this responsibility in appropriate situations.116  
 
115. See, e.g., Ellen Iverson et al., Factors Affecting Stress Experienced 
by Surrogate Decision-Makers for Critically Ill Patients: Implications for 
Nursing Practice, 30 INTENSIVE CRITICAL CARE NURSING 77, 77-85 (2014); D. 
Wendler & Anette Rid, Systematic Review: The Effect on Surrogates of 
Making Treatment Decisions for Others, 154 ANNALS INTERNAL. MED. 336, 
336-46 (2011) (concluding that at least one-third of surrogate decision-makers 
experience lasting negative emotional symptoms from making health care 
decisions for a loved one). 
116. See, e.g., Opinion, April R. Dworetz, End of Life, At Birth, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/05/opinion/end-of-life-
at-birth.html?_r=0 (describing difficult decisions to cease treatment of 
extremely premature infants and arguing that “[u]ltimately, parents have the 
right to decide, but we physicians must help them make informed decisions” 
and adding that she occasionally offers to make the decision for the parents.  
“If they agree, they are essentially making the decision, but are shifting the 
burden to me.  It’s harder for parents to say, ‘I unplugged my baby,’ than to 
let the doctor do it.”); Schneiderman, supra note 99, at 131 (describing a 
clinical case in which a dying patient’s family requested all life-supportive 
measures and the decision of the physicians to withdraw care from the 
patient after notifying the family and giving them an opportunity to transfer 
the patient or seek judicial intervention and observing that, after the patient 
died peacefully, the family “seemed relieved in the end that the physicians 
had assumed responsibility for this difficult decision”).  Commentators also 
have argued persuasively that the costs of the autonomy-based system are 
too frequently ignored and should be considered in making end of life 
decisions in limited classes of cases.  Alexander M. Smith, Beyond Autonomy, 
14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 23, 25-27 (1997) (“[M]edical law . . . 
[embodies] in the form of legal rules, the prevailing rejection of paternalism 
and the widely-held belief that people should be allowed to determine the 
shape of their own lives . . . .  What is perhaps less obvious, however, is just 
how autonomy has crowded out other values and how uncritically it is 
used.”); see also Harry R. Moody, From Informed Consent to Negotiated 
Consent, 28 GERONTOLOGIST 64, 64-65 (1988) (arguing that autonomy and 
paternalism are not, in fact, opposite concepts and suggesting that, in the 
context of long term care facility residents, it is ethically appropriate to use 
concepts of paternalism to enhance patient autonomy); Hilary Young, Why 
Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatment Should Not Require “Rasouli 
Consent”, 6 MCGILL J. L. & HEALTH 54-104 (2012) (“[W]hen consent is applied 
to create de facto entitlements to medical treatment, . . . interests other than 
those of the patient become relevant, such as physicians’ interest in not 
having to provide nonbeneficial treatment and the public interest in not 
having to fund treatment of little or no medical value.  Yet the law of 
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Although physician concerns about patient and family anxiety 
are well-founded, these conversations are integral to helping 
patients and families make good choices about end-of-life care.  
Avoiding discussions about the patient’s situation may in fact 
perpetuate anxiety by prolonging the process of accepting the 
illness and deciding about future care.117 
In this regard, two commentators have proposed a concept 
of “informed assent” to reduce the burden on surrogate decision 
makers who must make choices about withholding or 
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.118  Research suggests 
that family members in these circumstances welcome 
physicians’ explicit recommendations.119  The authors describe 
informed assent as inviting the patient or family “to defer to 
the clinicians’ judgment in favor of withholding or withdrawing 
life-sustaining therapy.”120  The idea behind informed assent is 
to convey to families as surrogate decision makers “the 
information that the clinicians are prepared to relieve them of 
unwanted burdens of making life-or-death decisions.”121  This 
proposal for a process of informed assent, while unlikely to be 
widely adopted, further emphasizes the importance of 
physicians’ initiating and leading conversations that the 
patient and family may otherwise have little appetite to 
 
informed consent is exclusively patient-centered and does not allow these 
factors to be considered . . . .” and adding that, although she does not 
advocate that physicians have a unilateral right to withhold or withdraw 
treatment, future policy in this area should consider interests beyond patient 
autonomy-based entitlements to care.). 
117. See Rachelle E. Bernacki et al., Communication About Serious 
Illness Care Goals: A Review and Synthesis of Best Practices, J. AM. MED. 
ASS’N, E1, E2 (Oct. 20, 2014). 
118. See J. Randall Curtis & Robert A. Burt, Point:The Ethics of 
Unilateral “Do Not Resuscitate” Orders: The Role of “Informed Assent”, 132 
CHEST 748, 748-50 (2007) [hereinafter Curtis & Burt, The Role of “Informed 
Assent”]. 
119. See Renee D. Stapleton et al., Clinician Statements and Family 
Satisfaction with Family Conferences in the Intensive Care Unit, 43 CRITICAL 
CARE MED. 1679, 1679-84 (2006). 
120. See Curtis & Burt, The Role of “Informed Assent”, supra note 118, 
at 748 (arguing that informed assent is sometimes an appropriate, ethical 
alternative to informed consent). 
121. See id. at 749 (providing also a discussion of three categories of 
withholding or withdrawing life-supportive measures and suggesting 
circumstances under which physicians could unilaterally decide not to offer 
particular types of care). 
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undertake.122 
Policies to encourage quality care at the end of life should 
be specific enough to encourage timely discussions and 
informed decision making but sufficiently flexible to 
incorporate the preferences of individual patients.  While some 
patients may prefer to remain in a state of ignorance, which is 
their right, there is surely another group of patients who will 
prefer the truth, and it is the physician’s obligation in these 
cases to provide it.  Determining in which group a particular 
patient places herself is simple—the physician need only ask, 
“What would you like to know about your prognoses and 
treatment options?”  (Even this question may prove difficult to 
ask, however, because it posits that there is something to 
know, and therefore tips the physician’s hand).  Nevertheless, 
the onus is on the physician to initiate the conversation, even if 
the patient then chooses to end it. 
The development and publication of guidelines for 
excellence in physician-patient communication may, by itself, 
fail to bring about widespread changes in physician practice for 
another set of reasons.  In addition to an understandable 
reluctance to have difficult conversations with dying patients, 
many physicians still value the exercise of individual clinical 
judgment above compliance with even the best of guidelines,123 
and may therefore decline to follow them.  Moreover, 
physicians often remain unaware of guidelines, even those 
developed and published by organizations in their field of 
specialty.124  There is also some suspicion that practice 
 
122. In any event, the idea of replacing informed consent with assent 
raises serious ethical concerns, since physicians’ prognostication skills are 
necessarily imperfect and a patient’s silence in response to a medical 
recommendation may not necessarily reflect comprehension of the 
recommendation, let alone agreement based on understanding.  See 
Constantine A. Manthous, Counterpoint: Is It Ethical to Order “Do Not 
Resuscitate” Without Patient Consent?, 132 CHEST 751, 751-54 (2007) 
(rejecting as unethical the option of entering a DNR order for a patient 
without the patient’s consent and suggesting that even informed assent risks 
arbitrary outcomes because it relies exclusively on the physician’s non-
omniscient judgment that CPR is medically inappropriate in a particular 
patient’s case). 
123. See Stefan Timmermans, From Autonomy to Accountability: The 
Role of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Professional Power, 48 PERSPECS. IN 
BIOLOGY & MED. 490, 494 (2005). 
124. See Dimitri A. Christakis & Frederick P. Rivara, Pediatricians’ 
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guidelines seek to reduce cost as much as to improve clinical 
practice,125 a concern that, in the case of end-of-life care 
practices, could be fatal to the implementation of the guidelines 
if it provokes sufficient opposition from pro-life groups. 
Ideally, health care providers, institutions, and policy 
analysts should reach consensus on how to approach the 
discussion of end-of-life issues, including an explicit statement 
of problems and goals, and an elaboration of clear, evidence-
based standards for best practices.  This would improve 
transparency and thus help allay at least some physicians’ 
concerns about adopting best practices guidelines.  The 
challenge is to implement these consensus-based practices 
consistently, beginning with the earliest steps of medical 
education, so that the culture of care at the end of life changes 
from one of denial and avoidance to one of open communication 
and cooperative decision making.  The process will take time 
and consistent effort but may, eventually, reach a tipping point 
where timely and informative conversations will become the 
norm. 
Recent developments promise improvement.  For those 
patients who are willing and able to engage in advance care 
planning, there is evidence of real progress with the 
proliferation of Physician Orders for Life Sustaining Treatment 
(POLST), which allow patients and surrogates to make and 
document detailed, situation-specific medical orders for end-of-
life care.126  Unlike other advance directives that patients 
complete with attorneys or on their own, the POLST document 
 
Awareness of and Attitudes About Four Clinical Practice Guidelines, 101 
PEDIATRICS 825, 825-830 (1998) (surveying pediatricians about their 
awareness of four pediatric practice guidelines and finding a range of 
awareness that varied from 16% to 64%). 
125. See Timmermans, supra note 123, at 496 (“The path of professional 
development is treacherous because the line between adopting and enforcing 
is easily blurred” and that “clinical practice guidelines are strongly associated 
with quality improvement and cost-control initiatives.”). 
126. See Editorial, Care at the End of Life, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2012, at 
SR10, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/25/opinion/sunday/end-of-life-health-
care.html (noting that 15 states have enacted laws authorizing the use of 
POLST forms and nearly 30 other states are considering such legislation); see 
also POLST, http://www.polst.org (last visited Mar. 28, 2016) (providing 
detailed information about these forms, their legal status and 
implementation). 
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requires the participation of the treating physician, who 
reviews the various options with the patient, signs the form 
along with the patient, and includes it in the patient’s medical 
chart.  The POLST paradigm has spread rapidly in the last 
decade and is now in some stage of development or 
implementation in approximately 45 states.127  In states that 
choose to mandate the utilization of POLST forms for seriously 
ill patients, the paradigm will have the effect of routinizing 
end-of-life discussions with patients and surrogates.  While this 
process hardly guarantees the substance and quality of these 
discussions, it at least requires physicians to have the 
conversation. 
Autonomy is meaningful only when it is exercised within a 
collaborative relationship between physician and patient, with 
the physician acting as an advisor as well as a source of 
information.  Focused physician training to improve 
communication and encourage shared decision making will 
lead to improvement over the basic model of informed consent.  
SDM provides opportunities for the physician to evaluate the 
patient’s understanding of his or her medical situation and 
encourages physicians to offer their own values (such as 
opinions about whether a particular medical technology is in 
the patient’s best interests) rather than simply providing 
patients with information and asking for a decision.  Shared 
decision making, when the patient and physician are willing 
and able to participate meaningfully, has the potential to 
ameliorate the problem of overutilization of care at the end of 
life.  As such, this model of decision making should constitute 
an important part of medical training and practice. 
 
B. The Important Role of Decision Aids 
 
Decision aids appear to have a significant impact on 
patient decision making in many medical contexts and will no 
doubt continue to play an important role in improving 
communication between physicians and patients or 
 
127. See POLST, supra note 126. POLST received tremendous support 
from the Institute of Medicine in its 2014 report.  See IOM, DYING IN 
AMERICA, supra note 2, at 17, 173-81 
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surrogates.128  Videos have been used as patient decision aids 
since the 1990s in a variety of clinical settings, including 
treatment for ischemic heart disease129 and PSA screening.130  
More recently, video decision aids have been proposed as a way 
to help patients and their surrogates make better-informed 
decisions regarding end of life care.  These aids are a promising 
development that can improve the possibilities for truly 
informed decision making.  To the extent that they deliberately 
or inadvertently manipulate the patient’s perceptions of the 
best choice, however, they may disserve that goal. 
A leading figure in the field is Dr. Angelo Volandes, an 
internal medicine physician at Massachusetts General Hospital 
and faculty member at the Harvard Medical School.  Together 
with his colleagues (the VIDEO Consortium), Volandes has 
created video decision aids for advance care planning and 
conducted an extensive program of studies to test their 
efficacy.131  One video tested in these studies depicts the daily 
 
128. See Chuck Alston et al., Shared Decision-Making Strategies for Best 
Care: Patient Decision Aids, NAT’L ACA. OF MED. (Sept. 2014), 
http://nam.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/SDMforBestCare2.pdf; Glyn 
Elwyn et al., Shared Decision Making: Developing the OPTION Scale for 
Measuring Patient Involvement, 12 QUALITY SAFETY HEALTH CARE 93 (2003) 
(describing the development and testing of a measurement tool to evaluate 
patient involvement and satisfaction in medical decision making); E.A.G. 
Joosten et al., Systematic Review of the Effects of Shared Decision-Making on 
Patient Satisfaction, Treatment Adherence and Health Status, 77 
PSYCHOTHERAPY & PSYCHOSOMATICS 219 (2008) (reviewing research 
evaluating shared decision making approaches in the context of a variety of 
health conditions and concluding that shared decision making is helpful in 
reaching treatment agreements); Annette M. O’Connor et al., Modifying 
Unwarranted Variations in Health Care: Shared Decision Making Using 
Patient Decision Aids, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Oct.  7, 2004), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/10/07/hlthaff.var.63.full.pd
f (reviewing the evidence in support of using decision aids and recommending 
strategies to increase utilization and ensure quality of decision aids). 
129. See Matthew W. Morgan et al., Randomized, Controlled Trial of an 
Interactive Videodisc Decision Aid for Patients with Ischemic Heart Disease, 
15 J. OF GEN. INTERNAL MED. 685, 685-86 (2000). 
130. Dominick L. Frosch et al., A Randomized Controlled Trial 
Comparing Internet and Video to Facilitate Patient Education for Men 
Considering the Prostate Specific Antigen Test, 18 J. OF GEN. INTERNAL MED. 
781, 781-82 (2003). 
131. ANGELO E. VOLANDES, THE CONVERSATION: A REVOLUTIONARY PLAN 
FOR END-OF-LIFE CARE (2015) [hereinafter VOLANDES, THE CONVERSATION]; see 
also ADVANCE CARE PLANNING (ACP) DECISIONS, http://www.acpdecisions.org 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2016). 
50http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/2
  
2016 AVOIDING OVERTREATMENT 787 
routine of an elderly woman with advanced dementia.  The 
other explains three goals-of-care options: life-prolonging care, 
including images of simulated CPR and intubation and an 
image of a patient on a mechanical ventilator; limited or basic 
care, including images of a patient getting antibiotics via a 
peripheral intravenous catheter; and comfort care, including 
images of a patient on home hospice care receiving 
medications.  Doctors or other health care professionals may 
invite patients to watch either or both videos as appropriate, 
depending on the patient and the situation.  The videos are 
intended to supplement, not replace, doctors’ verbal 
explanation of dementia and care options.132 
The motivating idea behind these video aids is that, by 
improving patients’ understanding of the benefits and risks of 
different levels of end-of-life care, the videos can help them 
make better-informed decisions about the kind of care they 
would prefer – and ideally, to express those preferences in 
advance directives, increasing the likelihood that unwanted 
care will in be avoided.  Volandes and his colleagues have 
published approximately 15 peer-reviewed studies to date on 
the impact of seeing these videos on different patient groups’ 
preferences regarding end-of-life care, their knowledge of 
relevant care options, and other variables.133  Almost all of 
 
132. See VOLANDES, THE CONVERSATION, supra note 131, at 112-15.  For a 
systemic overview of decision aids generally and their relationship to shared 
decision making, see Glyn Elwyn et al., Investing in Deliberation: A 
Definition and Classification of Decision Support Interventions for People 
Facing Difficult Health Decisions, 30 MED. DECISION MAKING 701 (2010). 
133. Kristy S. Deep et al., ‘It Helps Me See With My Heart’: How Video 
Informs Patients’ Rationale for Decisions About Future Care in Advanced 
Dementia, 81 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 229 (2010); Andrew S. Epstein et 
al., A Randomized Controlled Trial of a Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation 
Video in Advance Care Planning for Progressive Pancreas and Hepatobiliary 
Cancer Patients, 16 J. OF PALLIATIVE MED. 623 (2013); Andrew S. Epstein et 
al., “We Have to Discuss It”: Cancer Patients’ Advance Care Planning 
Impressions Following Educational Information About Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation, PSYCHOONCOLOGY (2015); Areej El-Jawahri et al., A 
Randomized Controlled Trial of a CPR and Intubation Video Decision 
Support Tool for Hospitalized Patients, 30 J. OF GEN. INTERNAL MED. (2015) 
[hereinafter El-Jawahri et al., A Randomized Controlled Trial of a CPR and 
Intubation Video Decision Support Tool]; Areej El-Jawahri et al., Use of Video 
to Facilitate End-of-Life Discussions With Patients With Cancer: A 
Randomized Controlled Trial, 28 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 305 (2010) 
[hereinafter El-Jawahri et al., Use of Video to Facilitate End-of-Life 
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these studies have found that participants who watch a video 
decision aid are significantly more likely to prefer comfort care 
to other end-of-life care options134 and to prefer not to be 
resuscitated via CPR, intubated, or put on mechanical 
ventilation.135  These findings have been observed for many 
 
Discussions]; Jessica B. McCannon et al., Augmenting Communication and 
Decision Making in the Intensive Care Unit with a Cardiopulmonary 
Resuscitation Video Decision Support Tool: A Temporal Intervention Study, 
15 J. OF PALLIATIVE MED. 1382 (2012); Angelo E. Volandes et al., A 
Randomized Controlled Trial of a Goals-of-Care Video for Elderly Patients 
Admitted to Skilled Nursing Facilities, 15 J. OF PALLIATIVE MED. 805 (2012); 
Angelo E. Volandes et al., Assessing End-of-Life Preferences for Advanced 
Dementia in Rural Patients Using an Educational Video: A Randomized 
Controlled Trial, 14 J. OF PALLIATIVE MED. 169 (2011) [hereinafter Volandes 
et al., Assessing End-of-Life Preferences for Advanced Dementia in Rural 
Patients]; Angelo E. Volandes et al., Augmenting Advance Care Planning in 
Poor Prognosis Cancer with a Video Decision Aid: A Pre-Post Study, 118 
CANCER 4331 (2012) [hereinafter Volandes et al., Augmenting Advance Care 
Planning]; Angelo E. Volandes et al., Health Literacy Not Race Predicts End-
of-Life Care Preferences, 11 J. OF PALLIATIVE MED. 754 (2008); Angelo E. 
Volandes et al., Improving Decision Making at the End of Life With Video 
Images, 30 MED. DECISION MAKING 29 (2009) [hereinafter Volandes et al., 
Improving Decision Making at the End of Life With Video Images]; Angelo E. 
Volandes et al., Overcoming Educational Barriers for Advance Care Planning 
in Latinos with Video Images, 11 J. OF PALLIATIVE MED. 700 (2008); Angelo E. 
Volandes et al., Randomized Controlled Trial of a Video Decision Support 
Tool for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Decision Making in Advanced 
Cancer, 31 J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 380 (2013) [hereinafter Volandes et al., 
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Decision Making]; Angelo E. Volandes et al., 
Using Video Images of Dementia in Advance Care Planning, 167 ARCHIVES OF 
INTERNAL MED. 828 (2007); Angelo E. Volandes et al., Using Video Images to 
Improve the Accuracy of Surrogate Decision-Making: A Randomized 
Controlled Trial, 10 J. AM. MED. DIRECTORS ASS’N 575 (2009); Angelo E. 
Volandes et al., Video Decision Support Tool for Advance Care Planning in 
Dementia: Randomised Controlled Trial, 338 BRITISH MED. J. b1964 (2009) 
[hereinafter Volandes et al., Video Decision Support Tool for Advance Care 
Planning in Dementia]. 
134. 10 of 11 studies measuring goals of care preferences found that 
those who saw videos were likelier to prefer comfort care than those who did 
not. 
135. Six of seven studies measuring one or more of these specific 
interventions found that those who saw videos were less likely to choose 
these forms of life-prolonging care than those who did not.  Note that these 
results are consistent with those from studies of video decision aids in other, 
non-end-of-life clinical settings, which also tended to show that participants 
who watch videos are less likely to opt for more aggressive treatments.  E.g., 
David Arterburn et al., Introducing Decision Aids At Group Health Was 
Linked To Sharply Lower Hip And Knee Surgery Rates And Costs, 31 HEALTH 
AFFAIRS 2094 (2012); Frosch et al., supra note 130; Morgan et al., supra note 
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different types of patients: seniors in doctors’ offices and rural 
health clinics, for whom end-of-life care is not imminent; 
elderly persons at skilled nursing facilities following acute 
hospital care, for whom it may well be a more pressing concern; 
patients suffering from advanced gliomas or gastrointestinal 
cancers with poor prognoses, for whom end-of-life issues are 
urgent; and persons of various races/ethnicities, religions, 
education levels, and health literacy levels. 
Insofar as a greater preference for comfort or palliative 
care is desirable for the reasons discussed earlier, the research 
suggests that video decision aids can increase the likelihood of 
outcomes that are both medically and economically beneficial.  
More importantly for this paper’s central theme, the research 
also indicates that video decision aids may improve the process 
of end-of-life decision making in several ways, including: (1) by 
making patients better informed about their options; (2) by 
making them more likely to have “the conversation” with their 
doctors and more likely to memorialize their end-of-life care 
preferences in an advance directive; and (3) by helping them to 
feel better about this difficult decision. 
First, the research indicates that patients who use video 
decision aids are better informed about their end-of-life choices.  
Generally speaking, using video decision aids can ensure not 
only that each patient receives a certain minimum of 
information relevant to their end-of-life decisions – thus 
addressing the problem created when either the patient or the 
physician is reluctant to broach the subject at all – but also 
that each patient receives the same basic information, in a 
clearly structured format (which of course may be augmented 
by additional communication by the physician).136  More 
specifically, in six of seven of the studies in which Volandes and 
his group have compared what participants who watched the 
videos knew about relevant end-of-life facts (advanced 
dementia or the likely outcomes from life-prolonging care) to 
what those who didn’t watch knew, participants demonstrated 
that they were more accurately informed about the prospects 
for the end of life after watching the video.137 
 
129. 
136. VOLANDES, THE CONVERSATION, supra note 131, at 112. 
137. Significant effects for the video decision aids on knowledge of the 
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Second, one recent study indicates that video decision aids 
also facilitate doctor-patient communication and that patients 
who watch videos are more likely to translate their preferences 
into advance directives that guide their subsequent treatment 
when they are no longer able to express their wishes.  
Participants were 150 inpatients who were suffering from 
various advanced diseases and had poor prognoses – less than 
one year to live.  Those who watched a video depicting CPR and 
intubation were significantly more likely than those who did 
not to have a discussion about these interventions with their 
inpatient doctors before being discharged from the hospital.  
And while the proportion of patients in each group with 
documented advance orders to withhold treatment was about 
the same before the study began, those who watched the video 
were significantly more likely to have such orders in their 
records as of the date of discharge.138 
Third, video decision aids may help patients to feel better 
about the decision making process.  One therapeutic benefit is 
that video decision aids appear to reduce the uncertainty that 
people feel in making end-of-life care decisions.  In one study, 
the researchers specifically compared participants’ level of 
uncertainty regarding their choices for care in case of advanced 
dementia before and after watching the dementia video, and 
found that watching the video led them to be more certain 
about their preferences.  In several other studies, fewer 
participants asked to choose a level of care option selected 
“uncertain” after watching a video than they did before.  To the 
 
depicted condition and/or intervention were found in: El-Jawahri et al., A 
Randomized Controlled Trial of a CPR and Intubation Video Decision 
Support Tool, supra note 133 (video vs. no video); El-Jawahri et al., Use of 
Video to Facilitate End-of-Life Discussions, supra note 133 (video plus verbal 
vs. verbal only); McCannon et al., Augmenting Communication and Decision 
Making in the Intensive Care Unit, supra note 133 (video vs. no video); 
Volandes et al., Augmenting Advance Care Planning, supra note 133 (video 
vs. no video); Volandes et al., Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Decision 
Making, supra note 133 (video plus verbal vs. verbal only); Volandes et al., 
Video Decision Support Tool for Advance Care Planning in Dementia, supra 
note 133 (video plus verbal vs. verbal only).  The only study in which 
significant effects were not found was Epstein et al., A Randomized 
Controlled Trial of a Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Video, supra note 133 
(video vs. verbal only). 
138. El-Jawahri et al., A Randomized Controlled Trial of a CPR and 
Intubation Video Decision Support Tool, supra note 133. 
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extent that being certain feels better than being uncertain – 
that is, being confident is good hedonically139 – video aids have 
therapeutic value.  And to the extent that patients who are 
more certain about their care preferences are less passive 
about their own health care-related choices,140 video aids may 
have therapeutic value in that respect as well. 
It is important, however, to point out two basic limitations 
of the empirical research supporting the claimed benefits of 
video decision aids.  First, in all but one of the studies 
comparing the preferences and/or knowledge of participants 
who saw a video about dementia and/or goals of end-of-life care 
to those who only heard a verbal presentation of that 
information, participants in the video group also heard the 
verbal presentation first.  None of those studies, therefore, 
allow us to determine whether the reported effects of the video 
on goals of care preferences or knowledge were due to the video 
itself as opposed to the mere repetition of the relevant 
information, first in verbal form and then in the video.  The 
potentially confounding effect of the repetition of the 
information would seem to be especially problematic with 
regard to the measurement of knowledge effects immediately 
after the experimental manipulation.141  Indeed, in the one 
study that appears to have controlled for this potential 
confound,142 the researchers found no difference in the increase 
in knowledge about CPR and mechanical ventilation produced 
by exposure to a verbal account versus the video.  Second, 
assuming for sake of argument that video decision aids both 
increase patients’ knowledge about their end-of-life options and 
 
139. See, e.g., Hart Blanton et al., Overconfidence as Dissonance 
Reduction, 37 J. OF EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 373, (2001). 
140. See Volandes et al., Improving Decision Making at the End of Life 
with Video Images, supra note 133, at 33. 
141. “Repetition is one of the most powerful variables affecting memory . 
. . .  [T]he fact that repetition improves retention . . . seems beyond dispute.”  
Douglas Hintzman, Repetition and Memory, 10 PSYCHOL. OF LEARNING AND 
MOTIVATION 47, 47 (1976).  The knowledge measures in the Volandes et al. 
studies are essentially measures of recall, and should thus be subject to this 
general principle. 
142. Andrew S. Epstein et al., A Randomized Controlled Trial of a 
Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Video in Advance Care Planning for 
Progressive Pancreas and Hepatobiliary Cancer Patients, 16 J. OF PALLIATIVE 
MED. (2013). 
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incline them to prefer comfort care, none of the published 
studies strongly support the inference that (as some might 
suppose) the two outcomes are causally connected—that people 
who watch video decision aids are more likely to choose comfort 
care because they understand their end-of-life options better.143 
Still, the consistent finding that watching video decision 
aids makes people more likely to choose comfort care is 
provocative and demands further investigation.  Do the videos 
have this effect because they improve end-of-life decision 
making or, on the contrary, because they impair it by biasing 
patients’ choices?  Although the research does not yet permit a 
definitive answer, there is some evidence for both.144 
On the one hand, video decision tools can influence 
judgment processes about end-of-life choices in a positive way.  
First, the use of video may increase patients’ attention to the 
information being presented, making the information likelier to 
be noticed, remembered, and used in subsequent decision 
 
143. This inference could be indicated, for instance, by a basic 
mediational analysis.  Specifically, a traditional mediational analysis would 
support the inference that watching a video decision aid makes people more 
likely to prefer comfort care because it makes them more knowledgeable 
about end-of-life outcomes if it showed that (a) watching video makes 
participants significantly likelier to prefer comfort care; (b) when increased 
knowledge is added to the model as a potential mediator of that main effect, 
watching video significantly predicts increased knowledge and increased 
knowledge significantly predicts a greater preference for comfort care, but (c) 
the direct path from watching video to the degree of preference for comfort 
care is no longer statistically significant.  See Reuben M. Barron & David A. 
Kenny, The Moderator-Mediator Variable Distinction in Social Psychological 
Research: Conceptual, Strategic, & Statistical Considerations, 51 J. OF 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1173, 1179-81 (1986).  None of the studies, 
however, report any form of this statistical test. 
144. The following discussion applies to video aids for end-of-life decision 
making generally.  Although we have Volandes and his colleagues’ videos in 
mind, we have been unable to obtain access to the actual videos used in their 
studies.  Links in their published studies are no longer active and other 
attempts to access the material have been unsuccessful.  We rely, therefore, 
on the descriptions of the videos in peer-reviewed publications, as well as 
what we infer to be still images or brief clips taken from those videos that 
appear in other, publicly available material and correspond to the published 
descriptions.  Talks at Google, Angelo Volandes: “The Conversation”—Talks 
at Google, YOUTUBE (Mar. 24, 2015), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fAOq1_qIstg&noredirect=1 (showing CPR 
on a mannequin at 34:53-35:05). 
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making.145  Second, considerable research on multimedia 
learning attests to the benefits of well-designed visual 
instruction.146  Dual coding theory147 posits that people think 
both visually and verbally.  By offering visual stimuli, video 
decision aids should appeal more directly to the visual 
processing channel, and may be especially effective for people 
whose learning style inclines toward the visual.148  Third, and 
perhaps most importantly, a video depicting a person with 
advanced dementia or a patient undergoing CPR or mechanical 
ventilation is likely to induce stronger, more confident 
understanding than a verbal description of those things.  
Seeing the video provides patients with a vicarious form of 
experiential knowledge, and a person who has had the 
experience of x can imagine and remember x in ways that 
someone lacking that experience cannot.149  Volandes and 
colleagues have often remarked that watching these videos 
enables patients to “imagine the unimaginable” and begin to 
understand what it might be like to be in the depicted person’s 
position150 – surely a component of truly informed decision 
making. 
On the other hand, video decision tools may also bias end-
of-life choices.  One concern is that video decision aids may 
prompt overly emotional decision making.151  Volandes and 
colleagues acknowledge this risk,152 and their descriptions of 
 
145. See e.g., Brad E. Bell & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Vivid Persuasion in the 
Courtroom, 49 J. OF PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 659, 661-63 (1985). 
146. See e.g., RICHARD E. MAYER, MULTIMEDIA LEARNING (2d ed. 2001). 
147. ALLAN PAIVIO, IMAGERY AND VERBAL PROCESSES (1971); ALLAN 
PAIVIO, MENTAL REPRESENTATIONS:  A DUAL CODING APPROACH (1990). 
148. RITA DUNN, Capitalizing on College Students’ Learning Styles: 
Theory, Practice, and Research, in PRACTICAL APPROACHES TO USING LEARNING 
STYLES IN HIGHER EDUCATION 1, 3-18 (2000). 
149. David Lewis, What Experience Teaches, in THE NATURE OF 
CONSCIOUSNESS: PHILOSOPHICAL DEBATES 579, 579-95 (1997). 
150. Angelo E. Volandes et al., The Psychology of Using and Creating 
Video Decision Aids for Advance Care Planning, PSYCHOL. OF DECISION 
MAKING IN MED. AND HEALTH CARE, 190, 190 (2007) [hereinafter Volandes et 
al., The Psychology of Using and Creating Video Decision Aids for Advance 
Care Planning]. 
151. See id. 
152. See e.g., Volandes et al., The Psychology of Using and Creating 
Video Decision Aids for Advance Care Planning, supra note 150, at 193; 
Volandes et al., Assessing End-of-Life Preferences for Advanced Dementia in 
57
  
794 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:3 
their videos and the production process indicate that they have 
taken some pains to avoid overly emotion-provoking content.153  
Nevertheless, the fact that even Volandes’ most in-depth 
discussions of his filmmaking strategies and goals make only 
the most passing reference to viewers’ emotional responses154 
indicates that the research may not have adequately accounted 
for potential emotional bias.  Whether and to what extent 
emotional responses to video decision aids should be considered 
as impairing or enhancing good judgment is itself a highly 
debatable matter.  Some emotions (for instance, moderate 
sadness and/or sympathy) may facilitate good decision making 
about end-of-life care, whereas others (e.g., disgust) may not.  
None of the studies by Volandes and colleagues have measured 
specific emotional responses to the videos, however, so we 
simply do not know how strong those effects may be or whether 
they played any role in participants’ end-of-life care 
preferences. 
Second, video decision aids may frame the information on 
which a decision is to be based in such a way as to bias the 
decision.  Generally speaking, people are more willing to incur 
risks or costs to avoid a loss than to obtain or preserve the 
equivalent gain (prospect theory or loss aversion).155  If the end-
of-life scenario is framed so as to characterize or make salient 
the patient’s death, that would likely be perceived as a loss 
relative to the status quo (living patient), and the decision 
maker would be more inclined to incur costs – here, the pain 
and risk of life-prolonging treatment – to avoid that loss.  If, in 
contrast, the same scenario is framed to make salient the 
patient’s continuing diminished existence, that would likely be 
 
Rural Patients Using an Educational Video: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 
supra note 133, at 174. 
153. See e.g., VOLANDES, THE CONVERSATION, supra note 131, at 104-06. 
154. Angelo Volandes et al., Audio-Video Decision Support for Patients: 
The Documentary Genre as a Basis for Decision Aids, 16 HEALTH 
EXPECTATIONS: AN INT’L J. OF PUB. PARTICIPATION IN HEALTH CARE AND 
HEALTH POL’Y 80 (2011) (not mentioned); Volandes et al., The Psychology of 
Using and Creating Video Decision Aids for Advance Care Planning, supra 
note 150, at 193 (mentioned in passing); Volandes et al., Assessing End-of-
Life Preferences for Advanced Dementia in Rural Patients, supra note 133, at 
174 (mentioned in passing). 
155. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and 
the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCI. 453, 453-58 (1981). 
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perceived as a (minimal) gain relative to the status quo, and 
the decision maker would be less inclined to incur the same 
costs to preserve the gain.  A video decision aid showing a 
patient with advanced dementia, for instance, makes salient 
the patient’s diminished life rather than the patient’s death as 
a loss of life, and hence would be predicted to incline decision 
makers against life-prolonging treatment. 
Third, watching the videos may trigger patients’ use of the 
affect heuristic,156 which could impair end-of-life decision 
making both by oversimplifying it and by biasing its outcome.  
Most activities involve both risks and benefits, which tend to be 
positively correlated (if correlated at all).  “Activities that bring 
great benefits may be high or low in risk but activities that are 
low in benefit are unlikely to be high in risk (if they were, they 
would be proscribed).”157  According to the affect heuristic, 
however, people tend to perceive risks and benefits as inversely 
correlated.158  “If [people] like an activity, they are moved to 
judge the risks as low and the benefits as high; if they dislike 
it, they tend to judge the opposite – high risk and low 
benefit.”159  Thus, a person’s affective response converts what 
should be a complex decision – such as whether to use life-
prolonging treatment in cases of advanced dementia – into a 
simpler, less conflicted judgment by aligning the pros and cons.  
The video decision aids, although apparently eschewing 
dramatic emotional appeal, still show distasteful images, 
whether of advanced dementia or sternum-breaking CPR, and 
the limited data available indicates that viewers respond 
aversively to these images.160  If their affective response to the 
video is one of dislike, viewers may intuitively regard life-
prolonging treatment as high cost and low benefit and thus to 
be avoided, rather than considering more thoughtfully the pros 
and cons of what might reasonably be described as a high cost 
and (depending on the value placed on continued life) a high 
benefit activity. 
 
156. Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, 177 EUR. J. OF OPERATIONAL 
RES. 1333, 1338-39 (2007). 
157. Id. at 1343. 
158. Id. at 1342-43. 
159. Id. at 1343. 
160. See generally Deep et al., supra note 133. 
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It is important to put the critiques in perspective.  Video 
decision aids may well improve end-of-life decision making to 
the extent that their strengths and even their potential biases 
help to counteract the judgmental biases likely to exist when 
patients or their surrogates make these decisions without the 
videos.  The relevant question, that is, is not whether video 
decision aids lead to optimal decision making, but rather 
whether they are likely to lead to better decision making.  For 
instance, we observed earlier that videos may induce a framing 
bias that makes the risks and costs of life-prolonging treatment 
more salient relative to its benefits.  It’s very possible, however, 
that without the videos, patients, especially healthy patients, 
would tend to underestimate how bad things are likely to be 
toward end of their lives if they should then be suffering from 
advanced dementia or terminal cancer.  People are generally 
poor at affective forecasting, that is, predicting how they will 
feel in the future after various life changes, and they are prone 
to optimism bias, tending to believe that they will be able to 
avoid the bad events that befall others.161  In light of these 
default biases, even the biasing effects of video decision aids 
could provide a helpful corrective, making it likelier that the 
level of care that people receive at the end of life accords with 
what they would prefer to receive, even if they are unable to 
express those preferences when the end approaches.  Moreover, 
given the pervasive denial of death in American culture 
mentioned earlier, and (relatedly) the “magical thinking” that 
leads many patients to “believe that however unlikely a 
procedure is to be effective, it will work when applied to their 
particular case,”162 decision aids that give patients and their 
families a more realistic and a deeper, more experiential 
understanding of the actual benefits and costs of life-
prolonging treatment would seem, on balance, to be 
worthwhile. 
 
161. On affective forecasting errors, see, e.g., DANIEL GILBERT, 
STUMBLING ON HAPPINESS (2006).  On optimism bias, see, e.g., Neil D. 
Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. OF 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic 
Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems: Conclusions from a 
Community-Wide Sample, 10 J. OF BEHAV. MED. 481 (1987). 
162. Volandes et al., The Psychology of Using and Creating Video 
Decision Aids for Advance Care Planning, supra note 150, at 195. 
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C. Beyond Informed Consent: Achieving the Goal of Authentic 
Choice 
 
Shared decision making and the appropriate use of 
decision aids promise much progress beyond the minimum 
required by informed consent law towards the goal of truly 
informed consent.  Nevertheless, even these measures do not 
guarantee the authenticity of end-of-life choices.163  The ideal of 
authenticity requires that the patient not only understand 
intellectually the nature of the treatment and its risks and 
benefits, but also have the emotional ability to make these 
decisions and a functional value system through which to 
evaluate the appropriateness of the choice for him or herself.164 
In order to make authentic medical decisions, patients 
must be willing to acknowledge that they are dying (which 
requires honest information about terminal status and 
prognosis from the physician) and to think about and then 
articulate to the physician their goals of care—such as 
prolongation of life, reduction of suffering, or maintenance of 
dignity and independence.  The broader goal, then, is to create 
an environment and a process that maximizes the opportunity 
for patients to make end-of-life decisions using accurate, 
comprehensible information and while reflecting on how they 
have lived their lives and what they value at the end. 
It is difficult to assess how often patient decisions reflect 
this sort of authenticity, but it is probably relatively rare 
 
163. See, e.g., Insoo Hyun, Waiver of Informed Consent, Cultural 
Sensitivity, and the Problem of Unjust Families and Traditions, 32 HASTINGS 
CTR. REP. 14, 15 (2002) (describing the role of authentic values in the ideal of 
personal autonomy and arguing that informed consent or the waiver of 
consent must rest on patient values that are “free of coercive formative 
influences.”); see also Daniel Brudney, Choosing for Another: Beyond 
Autonomy and Best Interests, 39 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 31, 31-32 (2009) 
(describing authenticity as “the capacity to be a particular self, a distinctive 
individual . . . .”). 
164. One commentator, in discussing decision-making competence, 
captures the elements of an authentic decision: “Logically and conceptually, 
decision-making competence can be broken down into three distinct rubrics.  
They are, respectively, cognitive, emotional, and valuational competence.”  
See Kluge, supra note 68, at 297. 
61
  
798 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  36:3 
because so many barriers exist.  Patients do not know what 
questions to ask.  Even when patients have questions, fear and 
denial of illness or deference to physicians may inhibit them 
from asking.  The ability to talk openly requires that both 
patients and physicians acknowledge what they are feeling and 
undertake these conversations despite their inherent emotional 
challenges.165  There is no way to mandate this level of 
emotional engagement between any individual physician and 
patient; it will, if it occurs, depend entirely on the character 
and inclinations of the individuals in question.  From the 
physician’s perspective, authenticity requires physicians to be 
emotionally self-aware enough to recognize when they are 
avoiding difficult conversations with patients and families and 
to correct for this avoidance.  Physicians must also have 
sufficient emotional intelligence to manage these conversations 
with patients and families whose own part in the conversation 
is very likely hampered by fear, regret, or grief.  Many 
physicians very capably engage in these conversations, but 
because people vary so much in temperament and their ability 
to acknowledge and discuss difficult emotions, it would be 
unrealistic to expect all physicians (or patients) to behave this 
way.  Nevertheless, given the complexity and importance of 
end-of-life decisions, striving for authenticity is worth the 
effort. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
As the baby boomer population continues to age, the 
problems surrounding end-of-life care will become both more 
prevalent and more complex.  Recognizing the acute need to 
address the lives and deaths of an aging population, health 
policy experts, legislatures, and the medical community are 
seeking ways to improve the quality of both communication 
 
165. See Duffy, supra note 113, at 140 (noting that good communication, 
in the form of allowing the patient to talk, responding to patients’ emotions, 
and building rapport “are not trivial skills.  They are the crux of competent 
medical care, particularly from the patient’s and the public’s point of view.”); 
Diane E. Meier et al., The Inner Life of Physicians and Care of the Seriously 
Ill, 286 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 3007, 3007-08 (2001) (encouraging physicians to be 
self-aware, to acknowledge their emotions as they care for dying patients in 
order to improve quality of care and to guard the physician’s own well-being). 
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and care at the end of life.  Part of the solution is to remove the 
dividing line between therapeutic and palliative care and to 
focus instead on training physicians to integrate the two.166  
But that alone will not improve care as desired unless 
physicians and patients communicate better about their choices 
and the implications of these choices. 
Informed consent law, the SDM model, and video decision 
aids all can play an important part in trying to reorient 
physicians and patients toward truly informed (and perhaps 
even authentic) choice, but no legal reform can require that 
patients confront their own mortality or that physicians help 
them to do so.  In end-of-life care, relying on the patient’s 
exercise of his autonomous choice is often insufficient to 
promote sound medical decision making and, in particular, to 
avoid care that is excessive, whether measured by its physical 
benefits or its consistency with the patient’s own true values 
and preferences.  Fear, denial of death, deference to physician 
authority, lack of trust, or simple ignorance often makes 
patients and families reluctant to initiate discussions about the 
uncertain future.  Physicians must be more willing to step 
outside the comfortable confines of the traditional model of 
informed consent, which sometimes allows them to evade 
responsibility for the well-being of patients, and initiate 
conversations that provide honest information and advice 
about end-of-life choices.  The process of shared decision 
making, if well implemented, represents a significant step 
forward, but it requires willingness on the part of individual 
physicians and patients to undertake it, which is something 
that education or reform can encourage but not compel. 
Fully informed and authentic decision-making represents 
the gold standard for end-of-life choices.  When achieved, this 
gold standard means that the patient’s decisions truly satisfy 
the goal of autonomy, whether the decision is to receive or 
forego all life-prolonging care, or to request something along 
 
166. There is a growing interest in the integration of the modifying 
influence of palliative care into the care and culture of the ICU.  The IPAL-
ICU project seeks to improve palliative care in the ICU by providing a central 
repository for exchanging evidence, expertise, and information.  See 
Improving Palliative Care in the ICU, CAPC.ORG, 
https://www.capc.org/ipal/ipal-icu/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2016); see also [add 
cross-reference to forthcoming article with Kathy Cerminara]. 
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the continuum of care options.  Meaningful communication 
between physician and patient is what makes the realization of 
autonomy possible.  Similarly, where the patient’s wishes are 
unknown or in dispute, good care requires meaningful 
communication with the patient’s family or appointed proxy 
about discontinuing medically inappropriate treatments while 
avoiding misunderstandings with the family about the goals of 
care.  It is important for both physicians and patients to 
recognize that ceasing therapeutic care or life-prolonging 
measures when they are no longer beneficial is not a failure of 
care.  In fact, the opposite is true. The conversations needed to 
yield this kind of communication, and the emotions that inhere 
in those conversations, ask much of physicians because 
providing comfort to dying patients and their families requires 
physicians to move beyond the idea of cure to a broader notion 
of medical care.  That broader notion of care, however, can 
reduce unwanted suffering and better comport with patients’ 
true preferences, both of which are surely desirable outcomes 
at the end of life. 
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